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The Magna Carta drafters did not contemplate Facebook, Twitter,
or texting when they formalized the jury system, a system that
remains mostly unchanged 800 years after its inception. Those
primed for jury duty over the coming decades have grown up with a
cell phone in their hand and news at their fingertips. It is
unreasonable to expect Gen Zers to meet the "radio-silence"mandate
of jury duty. As smartphones become the de facto method of
communication, courts, legislatures, and scholars offer prohibitions,
admonitions, and increasedpunishment to curtailjuror misconduct.
These reforms, however, do little to prevent the kind of harmful error
they seek to avoid. Instead,jury reforms deter members of an alreadyreluctant jury pool and demonize communications that do not
infringe on defendants' due process rights. This Article explains why
the presence of smartphones demands courts exercise flexibility and
understandingwhen consideringjuror misconduct. Juror misconduct
reforms are overreaching and unnecessary; harmless error review is
all that is necessary to regulate juror smartphone use. In this
instance, the presence of new technology demands change; failure to
accommodate Gen Z communication will yield a breakdown in our
jury system.

* James D. Hopkins Professor of Law, Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace
University. The author thanks the Honorable Cathy Seibel (S.D.N.Y.) and Mark
Berman, Esq. for their thoughtful engagements, Bridget Crawford for continued
encouragement and thoughtful insights, and Richard Montalvo for his outstanding
research assistance.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Magna Carta drafters did not contemplate Facebook,
Twitter, or texting when they formalized the jury system, a system
that remains mostly unchanged 800 years after its inception.I Those
primed for jury duty over the coming decades have grown up with a
2
cell phone in their hands and news at their fingertips. It is
unreasonable, therefore, to expect Gen Zers to meet the "radiosilence" demands of jury duty, regardless of jury instructions
prohibiting technological communications. Our jury system must
adapt to present-day realities.
Consider the following: In 2014, an upstate New York court
seated twenty-three-year-old Johnna Lorraine on the jury of a highprofile murder trial. 3 Despite the trial judge's warning against cell
phone use given at the beginning of the trial and forty-five more
5
times, 4 Lorraine exchanged over 7,000 texts during the trial. In
response to the defendant's request for a new trial, the trial judge
ruled that while Lorraine committed misconduct, the texts
themselves were not biased. 6 The district attorney even advocated
7
for Lorraine, saying she showed respect for the judicial system.
Consequently, the trial court ruled that her conduct did not taint the
9
process. 8 Nor did it punish Lorraine for her loose fingers.
The judge in the Harvey Weinstein trial found it almost
impossible to select a jury.1 0 Potential jurors posted on Facebook,

1.

See Thomas J. McSweeney, Magna Carta, and the Right to Trial by Jury, in

MAGNA CARTA: MUSE & MENTOR 139, 145 (Randy J. Holland ed., 2014).
2. Heather Watson, How Obsessed is Gen Z with Mobile Technology?, CTR. FOR
https://genhq.com/how-obsessed-is-gen-z-with-mobileKINETICS,
GENERATIONAL
technology/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2020).
3. Ed Shanahan, After Juror Exchanged 7,000 Texts, Murder Verdict is
Overturned, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/31/

nyregion/robert-neulander-wife-murdered.html.
4. Christian Nolan, The Juror Who Exchanged 7,000 Text Messages, 91 N.Y.
STATE BAR ASS'N J., Mar. 2019, at 24, 24.

5. Shanahan, supra note 3.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See id.
9. Id. Although the court chose not to punish her, both an appellate court and
New York's highest court, the Court of Appeals, ruled against the State and granted
a new trial. People v. Neulander, 80 N.Y.S.3d 791, 797 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018) aff'd,
135 N.E.3d 302 (N.Y. 2019).
10. See Michael R. Sisak, Weinstein Lawyers: 'Circus'Atmosphere,Juror Tweets
Unfair, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Jan. 15, 2020, 7:19 PM), https://www.us
news.com/news/entertainment/articles/2020-01-15/lawyers-at-weinstein-trial-workto-whittle-jury-pool.
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Twitter, and Instagram despite the judge prohibiting such conduct
"a thousand times."11 One man purportedly in the running for
Weinstein's jury tweeted about leveraging "serving on the jury of a
high-profile case" to promote a novel he wrote. 12 According to
Weinstein's lawyers, another potential juror responded with a
laughing emoji when someone asked if she would be selected. 13
The jury system grew out of a desire to prevent the accused from
suffering punishment without "lawful judgment of [their] peers." 14
The importance of judgment by equals was paramount to our
nation's founders. 15 The First and Second
Constitutional
Conventions, the Bill of Rights, and the Sixth and Seventh
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution extend to citizens a right to
trial by jury.16
Due Process guarantees jury deliberations free from harmful
taint or misconduct.1 7 Juror misconduct occurs when jurors violate
their oaths to the court and engage in improper conduct that affects
their ability to remain impartial and unbiased. 18 Proof that juror
conduct prejudiced the defendant can, absent a showing of harmless
error, result in a mistrial.19
Juror misconduct can range from refusing to deliberate to
serving while intoxicated to communication or research outside of
the courtroom. 20 It is the latter that is proving most problematic
today. Google searches, social media, and text communications have
virtually lured jurors outside the brick-and-mortar courtroom.
Consequently, jurors at best vent their frustration with selection to a
jury or their opinions on the case and, at worst, research
2
constitutionally-barred evidence. 1

11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 169 (1968) (Black, J., concurring).
15. Id. at 152.
16. U.S. CONST. amends. VI, VII.
17. See State v. Martinez, 896 A.2d 109, 113 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006) (appealing
on grounds of jury "taint" and prosecutorial "misconduct" as violations of the right to
due process).
18. See, e.g., Bogue v. State, 204 S.W.3d 828, 830 (Tex. App. 2006) (explaining
the requirements of what constitutes jury misconduct).
19. See id. at 829 (explaining when jury misconduct will result in a new trial).
20. 5 Examples of Juror Misconduct that May Be Grounds for an Appeal,
LAURENT L. OFF. (Sept. 15, 2015), http://llolegal.com/5-examples-of-juror-misconductthat-may-be-grounds-for-an-appeal/.

21.

See infra notes 104-05, 107-09.
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The federal government and all fifty states have tried to prohibit
22
tainted technology from entering the jury deliberation room.
Judges have issued prohibitive directives to empaneled jurors at the
beginning, the end, and even the middle of a trial. Some courts have
23
removed jurors' ability to communicate with the outside world.
24
Other courts have imposed sanctions on offending jurors. There is
25
no shortage of scholarship calling for stricter jury reform, but such
solutions are untenable given the demographics of today's jurors.
Fifty-five percent of our eligible jury pool grew up in the information
age. 26 This portion of the population regularly converses without
voice communication, does not need to ask for directions or open an
encyclopedia, and can engage in interactive gaming without leaving
their house. If case law is any indication, it appears that both
Millennials and Gen Zers are unwilling to part with their preferred
form of information and communication when empaneled on a jury.
Thus, cell phone prohibitions may further deter an already
undesirable civic duty.
This Article explains why communication in the digital age
demands the judiciary reframe the definition of juror misconduct.
Part II of this Article details the history of our jury system and
includes a discussion of juror misconduct both prior to and after the
Part III provides context for
evolution of smartphones.
of jurors, particularly how
generation
next
Z,
our
understanding Gen

&

&

22. See Eric P. Robinson, Jury Instructions for the Modern Age: A 50-State
Survey of Jury Instructions on Internet and Social Media, 1 REYNOLDS CTS.
MEDIA L.J. 307, 309-11 (2011).
23. See David P. Goldstein, The Appearance of Impropriety and Jurors on
Social Networking Sites: Rebooting the Way Courts Deal with JurorMisconduct, 24
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 589, 597-98 (2011).
24. Id. at 596-97.
25. See, e.g., David Aaronson & Sydney M. Patterson, Modernizing Jury
Instructions in the Age of Social Media, 27 CRIM. J. 26, 35 (2013); Christopher A.
Powers, Textual Misconduct: What Juror Texting Means for Courts, 67 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 303, 328 (2017); see also Leslie Y. Garfield Tenzer, Social Media, Venue and the
Right to a Fair Trial, 71 BAYLOR L. REV. 421, 423 (2019) (previous work on the
subject from this author). But see Patrick Brayer, The Disconnected Juror: Smart
Devices and Juries in the Digital Age of Litigation, 30 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS
PUB. POL'Y ONLINE 25, 47-48 (2016).
26. The internet debuted in 1991. Smartphones came into existence in 1992.
Millennials, those born from 1981-1996, comprise 30% of the populations and Gen
Zers, those born from 1995-2010, comprise 25% of the population. Michael Dimock,
Defining Generations: Where Millennials End and Generation Z Begins, PEW RSCH.

CTR.

(Jan.

17,

2019),

https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/01/17/where-

millennials-end-and-generation-z-begins/; Mark J. Perry, Beloit College Mindset List
for the College Class of 2022, AEI (Aug. 22, 2019), https://www.aei.org/carpe-diem/
22
/.
beloit-college-mindset-list-for-the-college-class-of-20
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this group communicates on a day-to-day basis. Part IV categorizes
proposed juror reforms into three types: prohibitions, admonitions,
and increased punishment, and it explains why all three fail to meet
the demands of both our jury system and the contemporary juror.
Part V makes the argument that full-scale prohibitions against
smart phone communications in the jury box is an unattainable and
indeed unnecessary goal. Gen Z's use of smart phones to
communicate demands that we reframe judicial misconduct to
include only those instances where a tweet, text, or post goes to the
heart of defendant's guilt or innocence. Restricting cell phone use,
strengthening jury instructions, or increasing juror sanctions for
Gen Z communications is constitutionally forgivable, therefore, when
the communication does not go to the heart of the defendant's guilt.
II. THE

JURY SYSTEM

Our contemporary jury system is among America's premier

principles of democracy and equality. 27 Its roots are planted in
English nobility. 28 Historians can trace the right to have peers
evaluate one's conduct to the reign of King Henry II, sometime
before 1215.29 The jury system's defining moment came with King
John of England's publication of the Magna Carta. 0 Chapter 39
included a guarantee that no free man suffer punishment without
"the lawful judgment of his peers."3 1 Although at the time, it was,
unclear as to just what "judgment of his peers" truly meant; many
believed jury duty served as a protection from "arbitrary rule" and
the power of the crown. 32

27. An ABA opinion poll found "[78%J of the public rate our jury system as the
fairest method of determining guilt or innocence; [60%] consider juries to be the most
important part of the justice system." Mark A. Behrens & M. Kevin Underhill, A Call
for Jury Patriotism: Why the Jury System Must Be Improved for Californians Called
to Serve, 40 CAL. W. L. REv. 135, 135 (2003) (citing AM. BAR ASS'N, PERCEPTIONS OF
THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 6-7 (1998)).
28. See McSweeney, supra note 1, at 145.
29. Id. at 139.
30. Id. at 146-49.
31. Id. at 146 (quoting MAGNA CARTA June 15, 1225, ch. 29 (Eng.)) ("No free
man shall be taken or imprisoned or disseized [i.e., deprived of his land] or outlawed
or exiled or in any way ruined, nor will we go against or send against him, except by
the lawful judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land."). Some commentators
argue that this language is not an actual guarantee. Id.
32. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 151 (1968) ("It is sufficient for
present purposes to say that by the time our Constitution was written, jury trial in
criminal cases had been in existence in England for several centuries and carried
impressive credentials traced by many to Magna Carta. Its preservation and proper
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By the 1800s, William Blackstone cemented the notion that the
Magna Carta is the jury trial's foundation. Blackstone wrote the
following, which has been often quoted:
Our law has therefore wisely placed this strong .and
two-fold barrier, of a presentment and a trial by jury,
between the liberties of the people and the
prerogative of the crown. It was necessary, for
preserving the admirable balance of our constitution,
to vest the executive power of the laws in the prince:
and yet this power might be dangerous and
destructive to that very constitution, if exerted
without check or control . . . . [T]he founders of the
English law have, with excellent forecast, contrived
that . . . the truth of every accusation, whether
preferred in the shape of indictment, information, or
appeal, should afterward be confirmed by the
unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals and
neighbours, indifferently chosen and superior to all
suspicion. 33
This English legal tradition traveled with America's founders
across the Atlantic Ocean. John Adams wrote, "Representative
government and trial by jury are the heart and lungs of liberty.
Without them, we have no other fortification against being ridden
like horses, fleeced like sheep, worked like cattle[,] and fed and
34
Both the First and Second
clothed like swine and hounds."
Continental Congress cited a trial by jury, as opposed to the Crown,
35
The Second Continental
as a "great and inestimable privilege."
Congress listed interference with the right to a trial by jury as one of
36
the reasons for starting the American Revolution.

operation as a protection against arbitrary rule were among the major objective of
the revolutionary settlement which was expressed in the Declaration and Bill of
Rights of 1689." (internal citations omitted)); McSweeney, supra note 1, at 145.
33. McSweeney, supra note 1, at 151-52 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *349-50) (first omission added).
34. Founder Quotes, ARK. TRIAL LAWS. ASS'N, https://www.arktla.org/index.
cfm?pg=FounderQuotes (last visited Oct. 27, 2020) (quoting John Adams in 1774).
35. The Declarations and Resolves of the First Continental Congress,
(last
https://www.ushistory.org/declaration/related/decres.html
USHISTORY.ORG,
visited Oct. 27, 2020) ("That the respective colonies are entitled to the common law of
England, and more especially to the great and inestimable privilege of being tried by
their peers of the vicinage, according to the course of that law.").
36. Id.
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So important was the right to a trial by jury that the Framers
included it twice in the U.S. Constitution. Article III, Section 2, sets
forth: "The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment,
shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the
said Crimes shall have been committed." 37 The Sixth Amendment
provides, in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed ...
"38 The Seventh Amendment extends the right to a
jury trial to civil cases. 39
From its inception in the United States, the constitutional right
to a jury trial applied to cases where the government charged
defendants with felonies or crimes punishable by two years of
imprisonment or more. 40 The 1968 Supreme Court, in Duncan v.
Louisiana, extended the Sixth Amendment right to crimes
punishable by more than six months in prison and concluded that
the right to a jury trial applies to all states under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 4 1 In that case, Justice White acknowledged the import
of peer-based tribunals: "[T]he right to [a] jury trial in serious
criminal cases is a fundamental right and hence must be recognized
by the States as part of their obligation to extend [the] due process of
law to all persons within their jurisdiction." 42 Following Duncan, the
Court extended the right to instances where sentence enhancements
depend on a finding of fact 43 and, further, where a defendant faces
possible revocation of his release and an additional prison
sentence.44 In Alleyne v. United States, the Court ruled that any fact
that increases a mandatory minimum sentence is an element of the
crime and must be submitted to a jury. 45
Historically, trial by jury meant trial by white men. As of 1719,
"[e]very state limited jury service to men; every state except
Vermont restricted jury service to property owners or taxpayers;

37. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
38. Id. amend. VI.
39. Id. amend. VII ("In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States,
than according to the rules of the common law.").
40. See Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 211 (1968).
41. 391 U.S. 145, 161-62 (1968).
42. Id. at 154.
43. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313 (2004); Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 U.S. 466, 497 (2000).
44. United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2380 (2019).
45. 570 U.S. 99, 117 (2013).
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three states permitted only whites to serve; and one state, Maryland,
disqualified atheists."46 The Supreme Court eventually mandated
48
that jury pools include women, 47 persons of color, and those who
49
In each instance, the relaxation of a
did not own property.
discriminatory limitation was intended to bring the jury pool, and
ultimately the petit jury, more in line with the Sixth Amendment's
guarantee that a jury's composition represent a cross-section of a
community. 50 Today, individuals qualify for jury service if they are
U.S. citizens at least eighteen years of age, are adequately proficient
in English, 5 1 have no disqualifying mental or physical condition, are
not currently subject to felony charges punishable by imprisonment
52
of one year or more, and have never been convicted of a felony.

46. Berghuis v. Smith, 559 U.S. 314, 334 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(alteration in original) (quoting Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief
History of the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 877 (1994)).
"In this country women were disqualified by state law to sit as jurors until the end of
the [nineteenth] century." Id. (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 533 n.13
(1975)).
47. The Civil Rights Act of 1957 first gave women the right to serve on federal
juries. See Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, § 152, 71 Stat. 634. Wyoming
first allowed women to serve on juries in the 1870s. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex. rel.
T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 131 n.2 (1994) ("There was one brief exception.
Between 1870 and 1871, women were permitted to serve on juries in Wyoming
Territory. They were no longer allowed on juries after a new chief justice who
disfavored the practice was appointed in 1871."); see also id. at 131 n.3 ("In 1947,
Woman still had not been granted the right to serve on juries in [sixteen] states.").
By 1973, all fifty states passed legislation granting women the right to sit on juries.
History Made When Women Were Allowed to Serve on Jury, AP NEWS (Nov. 16,
2018), https://apnews.com/50fb651b7fb84221887f8a7534a87fff.
48. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880) (declaring West
Virginia statute prohibiting persons from sitting as jurors unconstitutional because
of color discrimination).
49. See, e.g., Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 223 (1946) (stating that a daily
wage earner is fully competent to serve as juror).
50. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also Taylor, 419 U.S. at 531 (holding that
Louisiana violated the "fair-cross-section" requirement of the Sixth Amendment).
51. This requirement is defined by the ability to complete the juror
qualification form. Juror Qualifications, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/
services-forms/jury-service/juror-qualifications (last visited Oct. 20, 2020).
52. A juror must also reside in the judicial district for one year. Id. In 2017, the
New York state legislature voted to allow convicted felons to sit on juries. See Bill
Mahoney, Senate Passes Bill to Let Felons Serve on Juries, POLITICO (May 7, 2019,
7
9
6:30 PM), https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/albany/story/201 /05/0 /senate299
v.
Wood,
States
United
also
see
passes-bill-to-let-felons-serve-on-juries-1009680;
U.S. 123, 150-51 (1936) (finding that it is not permissible to create an absolute
disqualification of government employees as jurors).
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In order to impanel a jury, jurisdictions send notices to random
members of the community, summoning them for jury duty. 53
Through these notices, the court assembles a jury venire, from which
a jury is selected. 54 There is no constitutional requirement that the
venire proportionally reflect the race, ethnicity, gender, or religion of
the community. The Sixth Amendment's guarantee to a right to an
impartial jury offers a "fair possibility" of representing a crosssection of the community, not a guarantee. 55
A jury is impaneled through voir dire, the examination of a
witness by judge or counsel. While voir dire presents counsel with
the opportunity to accept or reject particular jurors, the Constitution
places certain safeguards on the process to assure that decisions do
not unconstitutionally skew a jury population. 56 In Batson v.
Kentucky, the Court overturned a conviction where the prosecutor
used his peremptory challenges to strike all black jurors in the jury
pool. 57 By striking the potential jurors, the prosecution forced
Batson, a black man, to face an all-white jury. That jury convicted
Batson of second-degree burglary. 58 In overturning Batson's
conviction, Justice Powell wrote that the kind of racial

53. Those eligible to sit on a jury are called to "jury duty." See generally IND. R.
CT.: JURY DUTY (2014). A group of potential jurors is selected from among the
community using a reasonably random method. Id. R. 3. Jury lists are compiled from
voter registrations and driver licenses or ID renewals. See id. R. 2. From those lists,
summonses are mailed. Id. R. 4.
54. See, e.g., Taylor, 419 U.S. at 525 ("In this case, no women were on the
venire from which the petit jury was drawn.").
55. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) ("To be sure, the number
should probably be large enough to promote group deliberation, free from outside
attempts at intimidation, and to provide a fair possibility for obtaining a
representative cross-section of the community."); see Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S.
482, 493 (1977) ("Recent cases have established the fact that an official act is not
unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact." (emphasis
omitted)); Taylor, 419 U.S. at 527 ("It is part of the established tradition in the use of
juries as instruments of public justice that the jury be a body truly representative of
the community." (quoting Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940))).
56. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 360 (1979); see also United States v.
Jackson, No. 17-5883, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 9807, at *8 (6th Cir. Apr. 3, 2019) ("'[A]
long-standing statistical disparity is not enough to establish systematic
exclusion' ....
" (quoting Bates v. United States, 473 F. App'x 446, 450 (6th Cir.
2012))); Shelton v. King, 548 F. Supp. 2d 288, 325-26 (S.D. Miss. 2008) ("With
respect to the second and third factors, in order to demonstrate systematic exclusion,
petitioner must show not only that the members of the allegedly unrepresented
groups were not adequately represented on his jury, but also that this was the
general practice in other jury venires in the community.").
57. 476 U.S. 79, 100 (1986).
58. Id. at 83.
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discrimination the Kentucky prosecutors employed "undermine[s]
59
public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice."
To assure fairness in jury selection, Congress adopted 28 U.S.C.
§ 1862, which is a codification of the Batson principle. Section 1862
provides "No citizen shall be excluded from service as a grand or
petit juror in the district courts of the United States or in the Court
of International Trade on account of race, color, religion, sex,
60
national origin, or economic status." Thus, courts regularly reverse
decisions upon a defendant's showing that the jury selection
64
63
62
discriminated based on race, 6 1 color, religion, gender, national
66
65
origin, or socioeconomic status. Neither the Constitution nor any
statute extends protection against discrimination in jury selection to
68
age 67 or student status.

59. Id. at 87. According to Batson, a defendant may establish a prima facie case
of purposeful discrimination in the selection of the jury on the evidence concerning
the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant's trial. To
establish such a case, defendants must show: (1) they are a member of a cognizable
racial group, and the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from
the venire members of the defendant's race; (2) the defendant is entitled to rely on
the fact, as to which there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute a
jury selection practice that permits "those to discriminate who are of a mind to
discriminate;" and (3) that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an
inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the veniremen from the
petit jury on account of their race. The decision, in this instance, to strike black
voters without identifying a race-neutral reason for their dismissal, violated Batson's
right to a fair trial. Id. at 96, 100.
60. 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (2018).
61. Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1754 (2016) (noting that the focus on
race in prosecution's file proved strikes of two prospective black jurors were
motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent); Batson, 476 U.S. at 82
(petitioner challenging jury selection on the basis of racial discrimination); Carter v.
Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 322 (1970) (petitioners challenged jury selection based
on racial discrimination).
62. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 494 (1972) (discrimination claimed against
African Americans).
63. United States v. Gelb, 881 F.2d 1155, 1161 (2d Cir. 1989) (acknowledging
Jews are a cognizable group but that the defendant failed to demonstrate that Jews
were underrepresented in his venire).
64. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 360 (1979) (exclusion of women).
65. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496 (1977) (challenging the jury
selection process on the basis of discrimination against Mexican Americans).
66. Witcher v. Peyton, 405 F.2d 725, 727 (4th Cir. 1969) (challenging the jury
selection process on the basis of social and educational discrimination).
67. See, e.g., Willis v. Kemp, 838 F.2d 1510, 1516 (11th Cir. 1988) (finding that
age, as a factor, is unreliable and not easily divided into groups); United States v.
Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140, 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (rejecting defendant's contention
that persons eighteen to twenty-one years of age form a cognizable group for
purposes of jury selection because the defendant failed to establish that attitudes or
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A court tasks the jury, once impaneled, with evaluating guilt or
innocence and, in some instances, setting punishments. 69 To ensure
a jury understands its role, the judge will read the jurors a series of
instructions on procedure, conduct, and elements of the law. 70 The
instructions can be lengthy. A judge reads instructions throughout
the trial, generally at its beginning, middle, and before rendering a
verdict. 71 The Florida court system lists seventeen different pattern
jury instructions a judge should read during a criminal trial. 72 These
instructions define permissible jury conduct, including the right to
take notes, ask questions, and request transcripts. 73 The instructions
also limit certain behaviors. Florida Pattern Jury Instruction 2.1
Preliminary Instructions reads:
I now instruct you not to communicate with anyone,
including your fellow jurors, about this case. No
communication
includes
no
e-mailing,
text
messaging, tweeting, blogging, or any other form of
communication. You cannot do any research about
the case or look up any information about the case. If
you become aware of any violation of any of these
rules at all, notify court personnel of the violation.
During the course of the trial, the court may take
recesses, and you will be permitted to separate and
go about your personal affairs. During these recesses,
you must not discuss the case with anyone nor
permit anyone to say anything to you or in your
presence about the case. If anyone attempts to say

experiences of these young people differ in any appreciable way from those of older
people); Johnson v. State, 288 So. 3d 342, 345 (Miss. 2019) (providing an age- and
race-neutral reason for a peremptory challenge).
68. Students are not generally considered to be a cognizable group. See, e.g.,
United States v. Fletcher, 965 F.2d 781, 782-83 (9th Cir. 1992) (college students do
not qualify as a cognizable group).
69. Although jurors also sit on civil cases, this Article focuses on juries in a
criminal context. Note also there are petit and grand juries.
70. See The Judge and the Jury, JUD. LEARNING CTR., https://judiciallearning
center.org/the-judge-and-the-jury/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2020).
71. Id.
72. See Criminal Jury Instructions Chapter 2: Instructions During the Trial,
SUP. CT. OF THE STATE OF FLA., https://jury.flcourts.org/criminal-jury-instructionshome/criminal-jury-instructions/sji-criminal-chapter-2/ (last visited Oct. 28, 2020).
73. See generally id. (Section 2.1(a) permits note taking. Section 2.1(c) permits
questions. Section 2.2 permits requests for transcripts).
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anything to you or in your presence about this case,
tell him or her that you are on the jury trying the
case and ask that person to stop. If he or she persists,
leave that person at once and immediately report the
matter to the [court deputy] [bailiff], who will advise
me. 74

Failure to follow the rules comes with the threat of consequences.
Any juror who violates these restrictions jeopardizes
the fairness of these proceedings[,] and a mistrial
could result that would require the entire trial
process to start over. . . . If you violate these rules,
you may be held in contempt of court, and face
sanctions, such as serving time in jail, paying a fine,
or both. 75
In reality, a mistrial is the most significant consequence of juror
misconduct. A comprehensive survey published in Michigan Law
Review found judges rarely punish individual jurors whose
76
Punishment, some
misconduct is discovered before the verdict.
judges argue, is problematic as it deters too many potential jurors
78
from serving. 77 Most courts seem to limit punishment to fines.
Some judges, however, have taken a creative approach. In one
instance, a Michigan judge ordered a juror to write a five-page paper
79
Only a
on the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial.

74. See generally id. (Section 2.1 provides these preliminary instructions).
75. See generally id. (Section 2.1 provides this instruction).
76. Nancy J. King, Juror Delinquency in Criminal Trials in America: 17961996, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2673, 2741 (1996); Dennis Sweeney, Social Media and Jurors,
MD. BAR J., Nov.-Dec. 2010, at 44, 48 ("Most judges . . . are loathe to
impose sanctions upon jurors even when 'misconduct' has occurred.").
77. King, supra note 76, at 2748.
78. See, e.g., Marcy Zora, The Real Social Network: How Jurors' Use of Social
Media and Smart Phone Affects a Defendant's Sixth Amendment Rights, 2012 U. ILL.
L. REV. 577, 604 n.214 (2012) (citing an instance where a judge held a juror in
contempt for posting a picture of the murder weapon on the internet).
79. Id. at 601-02; see also Brian Grow, Juror Could Face Charges for Online
Research, REUTERS (Jan. 19, 2011, 1:14 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/
("Criminal sanctions against
01/19/us-internet-juror-idUSTRE70I5KI20110119
jurors are rare. When judges do penalize jurors for internet misconduct, they almost
always opt for fines. In February, a Superior Court judge in Georgia fined a juror
$500 for Googling information about a rape case.").
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handful of judges are finding jurors in contempt for violating court
rules. 80
The rules and proscriptions regarding juror conduct, like those
contained in the Florida pattern jury instruction above, illustrate
the degree to which juror misconduct threatens the integrity of our
justice system. A single juror's act of acquiring evidence in a manner

not regulated by constitutional safeguards can lead to a conviction
that violates due process. Courts, as a result, have wrestled with the
practical difficulties that come with empaneling and policing a jury
of twelve living, breathing human beings.
A. JurorMisconduct Generally
Juror misconduct occurs when jurors violate their oaths to the
court and engage in improper conduct that affects their ability to
remain impartial and unbiased. 8 1 Technically, any conduct that
contravenes a judge's jury instruction constitutes jury misconduct.
Deliberating under the influence of drugs or alcohol, 82 visiting a

80. Zora, supra note 78, at 601-02; see also id. at 604 n.213 (discussing a case
where a judge denied a mistrial but held a juror in contempt after the juror posted a
picture of the murder weapon on the internet); Grow, supra note 79 ("In July, a U.S.
District Court judge in South Carolina decided against charging a juror with
contempt after he looked up the definitions of "exhibit" and "sponsor" on Wikipedia
and brought printouts of his findings to the jury room. The judge found that the
research was not sufficiently prejudicial to the case, which involved illegal cockfighting."); Juror Theodora DallasJailed for Contempt of Court, BBC NEWS (Jan. 23.
2012), https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-beds-bucks-herts-16676871 (discussing
a case in England where a juror was jailed for six months for researching the
previous convictions of the defendant).
81. For a discussion of jury bias, see generally Richard Lorren Jolly, The New
Impartial Jury Mandate, 117 MICH. L. REV. 713 (2019) (discussing the effects of
Pena-Rodriguezon the development of impartial jury mandate jurisprudence); Anna
Roberts, (Re)Forming the Jury: Detection and Disinfection of Implicit Jury Bias, 44
CONN. L. REv. 827, 829 (2012) ("This Article conducts the first comparison of the
recent rash of proposals relating to the use of the IAT to address jury bias."); Mikah
K. Thompson, Bias on Trial: Toward an Open Discussion of Racial Stereotypes in the
Courtroom, 2018 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1243 (2018) (arguing that the safeguards
recognized by the Court in Pena-Rodriguezto assist trial courts in identifying racial
bias among jurors must be improved); Jessica L. West, 12 Racist Men: Post-Verdict
Evidence of Juror Bias, 27 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 165 (2011) (proposing an
amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 606(b) to allow a juror to testify about
"whether, during voir dire or other questioning under oath, a juror misrepresented a
material bias").
82. See Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 133 (1987) (affirming trial
judge's refusal to open post-verdict investigations into jurors use of alcohol and
drugs, noting "drugs or alcohol voluntarily ingested by a juror seems no more an
'outside influence' than a virus, poorly prepared food, or lack of sleep"); Ken
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83
and reading newspaper
crime scene without court supervision,
8
accounts 4 are all violative of standard jury instructions and,
therefore, constitute jury misconduct.
Not all jury misconduct rises to a violation of a defendant's
constitutional rights. A court will not grant a defendant's motion for
85
a mistrial due to juror misconduct absent harmful error, and the
86
burden on the defendant is high. The Court in Smith v. Phillips
observed, "[D]ue process does not require a new trial every time a
juror has been placed in a potentially compromising situation. Were
constitutionally
be
would
trials
few
rule,
the
that
87
a new trial in
justifies
misconduct
juror
acceptable." Consequently,
88
only limited instances.
Courts generally consider whether knowledge jurors acquired
outside the courtroom amounted to a discovery of the kind of
extraneous information that exposed them to evidence not

Armstrong, Drinking While Jurying: What Happens when Juries Decide to Tie One
on, MARSHALL PROJECT (Apr. 16, 2017, 10:00 PM), https://www.themarshall
project.org/2017/04/16/drinking-while-jurying (noting a few state court cases where
jurors engaged in alcohol consumption).
83. See United States v. Morrow, 412 F. Supp. 2d 146, 164 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(noting two jurors each visited crime scenes and brought extraneous information to
the table during deliberations); Sherman v. Smith, 89 F.3d 1134, 1143 (4th Cir. 1996)
(holding that a juror's unauthorized visit to the crime scene during a murder trial
where he observed the house where victims were found as well as a tree where the
weapon was recovered constituted harmless error).
84. See Taus v. Senkowski, 134 F. App'x 468, 470 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding a
juror's alleged exposure to newspaper accounts was found to be harmless error);
United States v. Martinez, 14 F.3d 543, 551-52 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding a juror's
use of a dictionary during deliberations and her watching news accounts as well as
the jury's awareness of publicity that surrounded her participation on the jury was
enough to entitle defendant to a new trial).
85. Estrada v. Scribner, 512 F.3d 1227, 1235 (9th Cir. 2008) ("[T]rial errorssuch as extraneous information that was considered by the jury-are generally
subject to a 'harmless error' analysis, namely, whether the error had 'substantial and
injurious' effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict."); Hawkins v.
Commonwealth, No. 2018-CA-001361-MR, 2020 WL 4723724, at *4 (Ky. Ct. App.
Aug. 14, 2020) (holding that jurors texting during trial about a subject other than
defendant's case did not cause harmful error).
communications
during
86. For examples of juror misconduct occurring
between jurors while involved in the deliberative process, which were held not to
justify a new trial, see State v. Gardner, 371 P.2d 558, 558-59 (Or. 1962).
87. 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982)._In McClesky v. Kemp, Justice Powell wrote that,
"Individual jurors bring to their deliberations 'qualities of human nature and
varieties of human experience, the range of which is unknown and perhaps
unknowable."' McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 311 (1987) (quoting Peters v. Kiff,
407 U.S. 493, 503 (1972)).
88. See Phillips, 455 U.S. at 217.
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introduced at trial. 89 Even in such cases, this exposure to outside
evidence only constitutes jury misconduct if the court finds it to have
prejudiced the verdict. 90
In Estrada v. Scribner, the Ninth Circuit highlighted the litany
of factors courts should consider when determining whether to
declare a mistrial based on a juror's outside research:
[A court] look[s] to the following factors to determine
whether a defendant has suffered prejudice
from juror misconduct: (1) whether the material was
actually received, and if so, how; (2) the length of
time it was available to the jury; (3) the extent to
which the juror discussed and considered it; (4)
whether the material was introduced before a verdict
was reached, and if so at what point in the
deliberations; and (5) any other matters which may
bear on the issue of the reasonable possibility of
whether the extrinsic material affected the verdict. 9 1
Courts have not found juror misconduct to be prejudicial where a
juror looked out of the tinted windows of her van to test the
credibility of a police officer's testimony that he could see the
defendant clearly through the tinted windows of a van. 92 Nor where
a juror brought a dictionary into deliberations and read the
definition of "reasonable" to fellow jurors. 93 Nor where a juror
deliberating a criminal case for manufacturing and possessing with
intent to distribute marijuana told her fellow jurors that the
defendant used to look like "a fat old hippie who probably smoked

89. See, e.g., United States v. Montes, 628 F.3d 1183, 1186, 1191 (9th Cir. 2011)
(holding that a juror's reading an online summary article did not prejudice the
defendant).
90. See id. at 1188.
91. 512 F.3d 1227, 1238 (9th Cir. 2008).
92. Reed v. State, 547 So. 2d 596, 597-98 (Ala. 1989); see also United States v.
Foy, 641 F.3d 455, 468 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding allegedly improper extrinsic
evidence that was introduced through misconduct of a juror, who conducted an
experiment outside the deliberation room and presented results of the experiment to
the rest of the jury, did not relate to the charge against the defendant and could not
have affected jury's consideration of evidence relating to charges against him, so
denial of the defendant's motion for new trial was not an abuse of discretion).
93. United States v. Gillespie, 61 F.3d 457, 458-60 (6th Cir. 1995) (holding a
juror's bringing a dictionary into deliberations and reading aloud the definition of
"reasonable," while an error, was not prejudicial and thus did not warrant a new
trial because the jury ultimately relied on the definition of "reasonable" in
"reasonable doubt," which was given in the jury charge).
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marijuana." 94 In one instance, a juror conducted an experiment to
demonstrate whether it was possible to hear a kind of "metallic
95
sound" that was crucial to conviction. The court ruled that the
juror's conduct did not rise to the level of reversible error because
the charged officers "either benefitted from the improper experiment
or the demonstration had no effect on the jurors."96
Conversely, a court found a juror's conduct harmful to the
defendant when she allegedly committed a crime during the course
of the trial, similar to the crime charged in the trial on which she
was serving, and then related the incident to other members of the
jury. 97 The Supreme Court reversed a conviction where a juror in a
tax evasion case learned that he could profit from rendering a guilty
verdict. 98 A federal court found juror misconduct to be prejudicial
where jurors learned from a newspaper article outside the courtroom
that the defendant retracted his guilty plea and allegedly tried to
escape. 99 A civil court found juror misconduct where a juror failed to

94. United States v. Mills, 280 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2002) Though a juror in
Mills improperly introduced extrinsic evidence to other jurors during deliberationsin a prosecution for manufacturing and possessing with intent to distribute
marijuana-when she told them that defendant used to look like a "fat old hippie
who probably smoked marijuana," the court held the extrinsic evidence did not
substantially and injuriously affect the verdict to require a mistrial because: (1) the
prejudicial statement was "ambiguously phrased;" (2) "[a]s soon as [the juror] made
the statements, the other members of the jury recognized that the comments were
inappropriate and sent a note to the judge requesting advice," and "[t]he judge
promptly instructed them to ignore the information in reaching their verdict;" (3)
there was substantial physical evidence of defendant's guilt; and (4) "[p]opular
culture has prepared jurors for the idea that defendants tend to be "cleaned up" in
time to go to court." Id. at 920-23.
95. Davis v. Velez, 15 F. Supp. 3d 234, 242 (E.D.N.Y. 2014).
96. Id. at 245-46 (holding an experiment conducted by juror who attempted to
demonstrate that the police officer could hear a "metallic sound" did not produce
serious miscarriage of justice or create sufficient probability of prejudice to the police
officers to require a new trial in an arrestee's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action because the
"[officers] either benefited from the improper experiment, or the demonstration had
no effect on the jurors," and the experiment "would not [have] generate[d] any
information or data that would have been novel for an average juror."). But see
Konkel v. Bob Evans Farms Inc., 165 F.3d 275, 282 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting United
States v. Beach, 296 F.2d 153, 158 (4th Cir. 1961)) ("Experiments performed by
juries, 'which have the effect of putting them in possession of evidence not offered at
trial,' constitute jury misconduct requiring a new trial, unless no prejudice results.").
97. State v. Ingram, 47 So. 3d 1127, 1134 (La. Ct. App. 2010), rev'd, 57 So. 3d
299 (La. 2011).
98. Remer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 228-30 (1954).
99. United States ex. rel Doggett v. Yeager, 472 F.2d 229, 231-32, 239 (3d Cir.
1973).
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disclose during voir dire that she had a separate trial pending
against the same defendant.100
B. JurorMisconduct in the InternetAge
The internet, social media, and cell phone technology pose
particular challenges to the integrity of the jury process. Instances of
jurors using search engines such as Google, networking sites like
Twitter and Facebook, and cell phone text communication all
compromise the constitutional limitations on evidence on which
juries can base their decision.
The internet has birthed a new type of juror misconduct: a
reckless level of communication by jurors through social media and
texting. As a result, jurisdictions have adopted whole new sets of
jury instructions to curb this type of behavior and to regulate it in
such a way that violation of the instructions sets a foundation for
juror misconduct.
New York law requires that a judge provide specific admonitions
to assure a fair trial.101 New York's Unified Court System amended
its rules in 2009 to include a reference to the internet and social
media. The rules currently read:
In this age of instant electronic communication and
research, I want to emphasize that in addition to not
conversing face to face with anyone about the case,
you must not communicate with anyone about the
case by any other means, including by telephone, text
messages, email, internet chat or chat rooms, blogs,
or social websites, such as Facebook, MySpace[,] or

Twitter.
You must not provide any information about the case
to anyone by any means whatsoever, and that includes
the posting of information about the case, or what you
are doing in the case, on any device, or internet site,
including blogs, chat rooms, social websites[,] or any
other means.

100.
2001).
101.

Barton v. Chi. & Nw. Transp. Co., 757 N.E.2d 533, 549, 553-54 (Ill. App. Ct.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 270.4 (McKinney 2014).
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You must also not Google or otherwise search for any
information about the case, or the law which applies
to the case, or the people involved in the case,
including the defendant, the witnesses, the lawyers, or

the judge. 102

New York's jury instruction is representative of jury instructions
in most jurisdictions. 1 03 Most jurisdictions include instructions on
smart phones and cell phones as well. Texas Pattern Jury Charge
1 04
200.1 includes an instruction to turn cell phones off. Pattern Jury
Instruction 7.01 for the Seventh Circuit prohibits communication
with anyone other than members of the jury through "telephone, cell
phone, smart phone, iPhone, Blackberry, computer, text messaging,
instant messaging, the [i]nternet, chat rooms, blogs, websites, or
services like Facebook, MySpace, LinkedIn, YouTube, Twitter[], or
any other method of communication."1 05
The standard for mistrial founded on communications made
through the internet, social media, or texting is identical to that for
violations in the pre-internet world. 106 Where a juror acquires
information relating to the defendant's guilt that neither party
offered into evidence, and where the information prejudicially
affected the outcome of the trial, the court will overturn the
defendant's guilt.107 Courts have overturned a verdict where a juror's
internet research in a medical malpractice case provided evidence
not introduced at trial;1 08 where a juror researched an old

102. N.Y. STATE UNIFIED CT. SYS., MODEL PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS 39
(2019).
103. See, e.g., PA. R. CRIM. P. § 626(C) (2015); CONN. JUD. BRANCH,
CONNECTICUT JUDICIAL BRANCH CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 1.1-5 (2013); U.S.
CTS. FOR THE NINTH CIR., NINTH CIRCUIT MANUAL OF MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS
1.12 (2007).
104. In re Atun, No. 09-16-0034-CV, 2016 WL 7242819, at *1 n.1 (Tex. Ct. App.
Dec. 15, 2016) (citing STATE BAR OF TEX., TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES: FAMILY
AND PROBATE 200.1 (2016)).
105. COMM. ON FED. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIR., PATTERN
CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 7.01 (2018).
106. See Baird v. Owczarek, 93 A.3d 1222, 1228-29 (Del. 2014) (applying the
inherently prejudicial "egregious circumstances" test to a juror's use of internet
research during trial).
107. Reed v. State, 547 So. 2d 596, 597 (Ala. 1989) ("The test for determining
whether juror misconduct is prejudicial to the defendant and, thus, warrants a new
trial is whether the misconduct might have unlawfully influenced the verdict
rendered.").
108. Baird, 93 A.3d at 1228-31.
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encyclopedia entry and read it to other jurors; 109 and where a juror
conducted an internet search on Paxil, a prescription drug the
defendant had ingested at the time she committed child abuse
resulting in death. 110
The advent of social media and text communications brought a
new type of juror misconduct. In addition to sharing findings with
fellow jurors, they now share information about their own state of
mind; their opinion on the case; and general observations with
friends, family, and even casual acquittances, all of whom are
generally not present at the trial. These "external communications"
are distinguishable from research-related conduct in that they do not
threaten the constitutionally protected introduction of evidence at
trial.1 11 Nevertheless, jurors' continued communication with the
outside world can pose a threat.
For the most part, judges seem to shrug their shoulders and
accept as given that jurors today, particularly Millennials and Gen
Zers, are going to engage in some kind of prohibited conduct. An
Illinois court dismissed the defendant's charge of jury misconduct
based on a juror's Facebook posts regarding her obligation for jury
duty.11 2 In reaching its decision, the court relied on the following
communication:

"As if one day of jury duty was not enough smh day 2
I'm soooo over it already!!!!

Lolol oh by the way this is goin n the fact that I gotta
keep showin up theren missin wrk...just cuz Ima vote
guilty lol. #impetty #PettyLinda."

109. Steele v. State, 454 S.E.2d 590, 592-93 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995).
110. People v. Wadle, 77 P.3d 764, 769-71 (Colo. App. 2003).
111. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982) ("Due process means a jury
capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it ...
"). While
external communications can of course be prejudicial to the defendant, they do not
inherently involve introducing extrinsic evidence into jury consideration in the way
that research-related conduct does. Compare Wadle, 77 P.3d at 769-71 (finding that
juror's internet research about the drug Paxil may have influenced the verdict), with
People v. Daily, No. 1-16-0813, 2018 WL 6920110, at *2, *5 (11. App. Ct. Dec. 31,
2018) (finding that a juror's conduct was not prejudicial when she posted to Facebook
her frustration with jury service but not any details of the case).

112. Daily, 2018 WL 6920110, at *2, *5.
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Defendant's motion also described Swint's interaction
with a third party who responded to her Facebook
posts:

"[THIRD PARTY]: It's your civic duty! Lol.
[JUROR]: Well, I'm over this duty lol."113
In another instance, a juror blogged about his pending jury
duty.11 4 He posted that, as a juror, he will get to "listen to the local
riff raff try to convince [him] of their innocence;" in the post he also
stated his views on a Supreme Court decision ruling against the
death penalty for juveniles and referenced an unrelated shooting
incident in Atlanta." 5 The New Hampshire Supreme Court ruled
that the blog was not prejudicial because it was unclear to whom the
term "local riff raff' referred and there was no evidence that the
6
other jurors knew of the violating juror's blog.11 Such rulings reflect
the Supreme Court's philosophy that trials happen in the real world
and that judicial error based on the human condition without proof
of harm is not sufficient to justify declaring a mistrial.117
The recent case People v. Neulander illustrates the problem of
8
selecting jurors who grew up texting.11 Dr. Robert Neulander was a
highly respected gynecologist in Syracuse, New York at the time he
9
was charged with the murder of his wife Leslie.11 The case drew
significant media attention, in large part because of Dr. Neulander's
prominence in the community.12

0

Johnna Lorraine was among the twelve jurors and two
alternates empaneled for the Neulander trial.121 At the
commencement of trial, Judge Thomas Miller instructed the jury

113. Id. at *2.
114. State v. Goupil, 908 A.2d 1256, 1262 (N.H. 2006).
115. Id. at 1262-63.
116. Id. at 1266.
117. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982) ("[D]ue process does not
require a new trial every time a juror has been placed in a potentially compromising
situation. . . . [i]t is virtually impossible to shield jurors from every contact or
influence that might theoretically affect their vote.").
118. See 80 N.Y.S.3d 791, 795 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018) aff'd, 135 N.E.3d 302 (N.Y.
2019); Shanahan, supra note 3.
119. Shanahan, supra note 3.
120. Accident or Murder? Investigating the Death of Leslie Neulander, CBS
4
NEWS (Nov. 16, 2019), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/accident-or-murder- 8-hoursinvestigates-death-of-leslie-neulander/.
121. Shanahan, supranote 3.
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that it "must not communicate with anyone about the case by any
other means, including by telephone, text messages, email, internet
chat or chat rooms, blogs, or social media sites, such as Facebook or
Twitter."1 22 Though the jurors were allowed to keep their smart
phones, Judge Miller continued to instruct the jurors-over forty-five
times-not to engage in third-party communications. 12 3
During the trial, Lorraine exchanged over 7,000 texts with
family and friends.1 24 Among the most notorious of these texts is one
she received from her father after she was selected to serve, which
read, "Make sure he's guilty!"1 25 One friend texted Lorraine, "Is he
guilty?" to which she replied, "Can't tell."126 In addition to her text
communications, Lorraine also allegedly visited various websites
and news organizations during the trial.127
Following the trial, an alternate juror reported Lorraine's
conduct to Neulander's attorney, who subsequently filed a motion to
dismiss the case. 128 Judge Thomas Miller denied the motion finding
that Lorraine had engaged in misconduct but not to the extent that'
it affected the outcome of the trial.129 Neulander appealed the case to
New York's Fourth Department Appellate Division. 30

122. See N.Y. STATE UNIFIED CT. SYS., JURY ADMONITIONS IN PRELIMINARY
INSTRUCTIONS 2 (2016) (setting forth the admonitions that statutory law. requires be
given to the jury as part of the court's preliminary instructions).
123. Nolan, supra note 4, at 24.
124. Shanahan, supranote 3.
125. People v. Neulander, 80 N.Y.S.3d 791, 795 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018) aff'd, 135
N.E.3d 302 (N.Y. 2019). Juror Number 12, Johanna Lorraine, sent and received
hundreds of text messages about the case. Individual text messages sent and
received by Juror Number 12 were troublesome and inconsistent with the trial
court's repeated instructions not to discuss the case with any person and to report
any attempts by anyone to discuss the case with a juror. Juror Number 12 also
accessed local media websites that were covering the trial extensively. In order to
hide her misconduct, Juror Number 12 lied under oath to the court, deceived the
People and the court by providing
a false affidavit
and tendering
doctored text message exchanges in support of that affidavit, selectively deleted
other text messages she deemed problematic, and deleted her now-irretrievable
internet browsing history. Id. at 795-96; see also Shanahan, supra note 3.
126. Shanahan, supra note 3.
127. See Nolan, supra note 4, at 25-26; Shanahan, supra note 3.
128. Douglass Dowty, How Alleged JurorMisconduct in Dr. Neulander Murder
Trial Came to Light, SYRACUSE.COM, https://www.syracuse.com/crime/2015/05/
howalleged_jurormisconduct_in_dr_neulander_murder_trialcame_tolight.html
(last updated Mar. 22, 2019).
129. Neulander, 80 N.Y.S.3d at 796.
130. Id. at 793.
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The Appellate Division reversed the lower court's ruling and
granted Neulander a new trial. 131 In that three-to-two ruling,
however, several judges suggested that they did not have a severe
problem with Lorraine's conduct. The court seemed to accept the
132
lower court's characterization of Lorraine's "intentions as pure."
Even so, the appellate court concluded that the juror's conduct and
texts received, particularly the one sent by her father imploring
defendant's guilt, "created a significant risk that a substantial right
1 33
of... defendant was prejudiced."
134
The Court of
The State appealed the appellate court's reversal.
intermediate
the
affirmed
court,
highest
York's
Appeals, New
court, 135 ruling that Lorraine's conduct of accessing available media
through the internet and texting with those not empaneled resulted
in "improper conduct" that "may have affected a substantial right of
the defendant." 136
In upholding the Appellate Division's ruling, New York's highest
court recognized that jurors do not exist in a bubble and seemed to
acknowledge that to expect individuals to not engage in the stray
text or internet search is unreasonable. 13 7 In this case, however,
Lorraine's conduct "disregarded the court's plentiful instructions as
to outside communications and when such conduct was brought to
138
light, the juror was deliberately and repetitively untruthful."
39
In Dimas-Martinez v. State,1 the Supreme Court of Arkansas
declared a mistrial upon discovery that a juror tweeted that the jury
40
had completed deliberations before it was announced in court.1

131. Id. at 794.
132. See id. at 796-97; Id. at 797, 799 (Smith & Winslow, JJ., dissenting).
133. Id. at 797 (majority opinion) (quoting People v. Giarletta, 898 N.Y.S.2d 639
(N.Y. App. Div. 2010)). The court looked at the totality of the circumstances in
determining that the defendant was prejudiced. Id.
134. People v. Neulander, 135 N.E.3d 302, 302 (N.Y. 2019).
135. Id. at 305.
136. Id. at 304 (quoting N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.30[2] (McKinney 1970)).
137. See id. at 305.

138.

Id. at 304; see also Giarletta, 898 N.Y.S.2d at 639-40. In Giarletta, a New

York appellate division court granted defendant's motion for a new trial based on
juror misconduct where the offending juror communicated with her sister via cell
phone and text message during trial. Some of the information discussed related to
the defendant's guilt or innocence. The communications, according to the court,
resulted in misconduct that created a significant risk that a substantial right of the
defendant was prejudiced. Id. at 640. Although a mistrial was declared, the juror did
not face any type of consequence. See id. at 639-40.
139. 385 S.W.3d 238 (2011).
140. Id. at 241, 246-49. The juror, Juror Number 2, tweeted throughout the
trial, even after the judge had questioned and admonished him to stop. Id. at 247.
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That same court revisited the issue of juror misconduct to different
effect in Finch v. State.141 In Finch, the court affirmed the denial of
the defendant's motion for a new trial despite proof that, during
deliberations, Juror Number 4 used his cell phone to look up
information and share it with other jurors. 142 A majority of the court
concluded that "a mistrial is a drastic remedy and should be declared
when there has been an error so prejudicial that justice cannot be
served by continuing the trial . ... "143 The court chose to replace
Juror Number 4 with an alternate and continue deliberations.1 44 In
United States v. Juror No. One, however, the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania ruled that a juror was guilty of criminal contempt for
sending unauthorized emails to other jurors before deliberations but
concluded that this was a violation punishable by fine, not
imprisonment.145
Facebook communications are also problematic. During
Baltimore Mayor Sheila Dixon's trial, five jurors friended each other
on Facebook.1 46 The group, which was dubbed "the Facebook Five" in
the media,1 47 violated judicial prohibitions by communicating with
each other about their jury experience on Facebook. In a Texas civil
trial, a twenty-two-year-old juror sent a "friend request" to the
defendant over Facebook.1 48 When the defendant notified the judge
in the case, presiding Judge Wade Birdwell dismissed the juror and
sentenced him to community service, citing him with four counts of
contempt.149
In People v. Daily, an Illinois appellate court found a juror's
series of Facebook posts, discovered post-verdict, did not violate

141. 542 S.W.3d 143, 146-49 (Ark. 2018).
142. Id. at 148-49.
143. Id. at 147. The dissent wrote that under Dimas-Martinez, "any access of the
internet in the jury room constitutes jury misconduct regardless of demonstrated
prejudice." Id. at 154 (Hart, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 148 (majority opinion).
145. 866 F. Supp. 2d 442, 444, 453 (E.D. Pa. 2011).
146. Ben Holden, Courts Must Be Prepared for Tech-Savvy Jurors_BALT. SUN
(June 23, 2011), https://www.baltimoresun.com/opinions/bs-xpm-2011-06-23-bs-edcourts-tech-20110623-story.html.
147. Julie Bykowicz, 5 Dixon Jurors Recalled as Witnesses, BALT. SUN (Dec. 30,
2009, 3:00 AM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/maryland/baltimore-city/bal-md.dixon
30dec30-story.html; Holden, supra note 146.
148. Tarrant County Juror Sentenced to Community Service for Trying to
'Friend' Defendant on Facebook, JUDGE WADE BIDWELL (Dec. 4, 2011),
https://judgewadebirdwell.com/tarrant-county-juror-sentenced-to-community-servicefor-trying-to-friend-defandant-on-facebook/.
149. Id.
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150
The juror's posts included
defendant's due process rights.
comments in response to her complaint of jury duty that read "vote
guilty," to which she responded, "LOL."151 After defense counsel
examined her, the court concluded that, despite her Facebook posts,
152
she was able to decide on the case impartially.
In one instance, a defendant appealed the court's decision to
dismiss a juror for communicating with a judge's secretary during a
case. 153 A Georgia jury heard the case of Robert Miller, who the
State charged with malice murder, aggravated assault, and
associated firearms charges. 154 During the trial, the judge's secretary
communicated through texts with one of the jurors about the
155
likelihood of the judge bringing donuts to court for the jury. After
reviewing the text messages and "out of an abundance of caution,"
the judge dismissed the juror. 156 The remaining jurors along with an
157
On
alternate who replaced the dismissed juror convicted Miller.
appeal, Miller argued that the judge committed plain error in
excusing the juror without first conducting a hearing to determine
158
the circumstances of the contact and whether it was prejudicial.
The Georgia Supreme Court rejected Miller's argument for failure to
159
properly preserve the issue for appellate review.
Jurors tweeting has been similarly problematic at the voir dire
level. During jury selection for Harvey Weinstein's New York trial
for rape and sexual misconduct, Weinstein's defense attorneys
alerted Justice James Burke that a member of the jury pool had
posted on Twitter.1 60 In the "tweet," the juror asked followers "how a

150. No. 1-16-0813, 2018 WL 6920110, at *5 (Ill. App. Ct. Dec. 31, 2018).
151. Id. at *2-3.
152. Id. at *5; see also Brian Grow, As Jurors Go Online, U.S. Trials Go off
Track, REUTERS (Dec. 8, 2010, 1:56 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-internet74 8 2
6
jurors/as-jurors-go-online-u-s-trials-go-off-track-idUSTRE B Z 0101208
(reviewing instances of jurors using the internet during trials and the respective
consequences).
153. Miller v. State, 847 S.E.2d 344, 345 (Ga. 2020).

154.

See id.

155. Id. at *2.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at *1.
159. Id. at *3. ("Because Miller failed to seek any investigation into or hearing
about the juror communication or its effect on other jurors before the trial court
acceded to Miller's request to excuse the juror and seat an alternate, the error Miller
now asserts was not preserved for ordinary appellate review.").
160. Elizabeth Wagmeister, Weinstein Judge Lectures Would-Be Juror over Bad
Tweet, VARIETY (Mar. 10, 2020, 8:42 AM), https://variety.com/2020/biz/news/harveyweinstein-juror-howard-mittelmark-tweet-court-judge-1203528690/.
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person might hypothetically leverage serving on the jury of a highprofile case to promote their new novel . ... "161 The judge, noting
that he had instructed potential jurors not to use social media to
discuss the case "a thousand times," threatened to hold the juror in
contempt. 162

A variety of juror behaviors involving social media use and other
forms of digital communication are forcing courts into largely
uncharted territories, requiring them to rule on issues at the heart
of our justice system. While uniformity in how courts choose to rule
in each situation is a long way away, there is at least one fact about
which courts seem to inevitably be approaching a consensus: this
new, digitally literate breed of juror is here to stay. Tweeting,
texting, blogging, and "friending" are forces with which our justice
system must reckon.
III. THE GEN Z JUROR
The next generation of jurors was born into the information
age. 163 Members of Gen Z,164 generally defined as the generation

born between 1997 and 2012,165 have never known a world without
the internet. 166 The Gen Z generation grew into adolescents and

161. Id.
162. Sisak, supra note 10 ("The court was alerted recently that a few prospective
jurors from last week went on Facebook and Twitter as if I hadn't just said not to,
what was it, a hundred times? A thousand times? Was anything I said ambiguous?");
Wagmeister, supra note 160; see also J. Clara Chan, Prospective Harvey Weinstein
Juror Who Tweeted About Trial Could Face Jail Time, WRAP (Jan. 16, 2020 1:22
PM), https://www.thewrap.com/harvey-weinstein-trial-prospective-jurors-tweet-jailtime/. After being dismissed from the jury pool, one man wrote on Twitter, "Now that
my jury service is officially over, I can say that telling Harvey Weinstein and his
lawyers to their faces that I could NOT be impartial was a fucking JOY." Chan,

supra.

163. Emily Seymour, Gen Z: Born to Be Digital, VOA NEWS (Aug. 25, 2019, 2:37
AM), https://www.voanews.com/student-union/gen-z-born-be-digital ("Gen Zers are
the first digital natives, born . . . into a world of vast technological advances and
innovations.").
164. The Pew Research Center noted that, by 2019, "Gen Z" had taken hold as the
name for the post-Millennialgeneration. Dimock, supra note 26.
165. Baby Boomers refers to the generation of individuals born from 1946-1964;
Generation X refers to the generation of individuals born from 1965-1980;
Generation Y (Millennials) refers to the generation of individuals born from 19811996; and Gen Z refers to the generation of individuals born from 1997 to
approximately 2012. Id.
166. Id. See generally Am. C.L. Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp 824, 830-38 (E.D.
Pa. 1996) (discussing the creation and evolution of the internet as of 1996).
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167
For them, communication and
teenagers in a post-Facebook world.
the sharing of knowledge flows in a constant stream across social
media platforms. 168 They are used to having their curiosity satisfied
instantaneously. 169 It is hard to suppress a Gen Zer's thirst for
instant answers through the lengthy and detailed process of building

a case.1 70
Between texting, sharing, and researching, the average Gen Zer
17
spends about three hours per day looking at a screen. 1 So integral
is screen time to our daily lives that it prompted Chief Justice
Roberts to observe in Riley v. California, "[M]odern cell phones,
which are now such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life that
the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an
172
important feature of human anatomy."
Gen Zers have been raised in the milieu of technology, thereby
understanding social media and texting as acceptable, if not the
173
Teens prefer texting over inprimary forms of communication.
174
Thirty-nine percent of Gen Zers value
person communication.

167. Facebook began in 2004. Sarah Phillips, A Brief History of Facebook,
GUARDIAN (July 25, 2007, 5:29 EDT), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/
2007/jul/25/ media.newmedia.
168. See Dennis Green, The Most Popular Social Media Platforms with Gen Z,
BUs. INSIDER (July 2, 2019, 10:57 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/gen-z-loves9 6
2
snapchat-instagram-and-youtube-social-media- 01 - (noting that 65% of Gen Zers
check Instagram daily, 62% check YouTube daily, and 51% check Snapchat daily)'.
169. Alex Williams, Move over, Millennials, Here Comes Generation Z, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 18, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/20/fashion/move-overmillennials-here-comes-generation-z.html (quoting a marketing consultant saying
that "we tell our advertising partners that if they don't communicate in five words
and a big picture, they will not reach this generation.").
170. Id. ("Generation Z takes in information instantaneously . . . and loses
interest just as fast.").
171. Gretchen Livingston, The Way U.S. Teens Spend Their Time Is Changing,
but the Differences Between Boys and Girls Persist, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Feb 20, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/02/20/the-way-u-s-teens-spend-theirtime-is-changing-but-differences-between-boys-and-girls-persist/.
172. 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014).
173. A Center for Generational Kinetics study found that Gen Z is four times
more likely than Millennials, Gen X, or Baby Boomers to say that age thirteen is the
appropriate age to get your first smartphone. Older generations were more likely to
suggest age eighteen. Brian Mastroianni, How Generation Z Is Changing the Tech
World, CBS NEWS (Mar. 10, 2016, 6:00 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/socialmedia-fuels-a-change-in-generations-with-the-rise-of-gen-z/; see Seymour, supra note
163.
174. Ivan Pentchoukov, Texting Surpasses In-Person Communication as a
Favorite Among Teenagers, EPOCH TIMES (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.theepoch
26
56
times.com/texting-surpasses-in-person-communication-as-favorite-among-teens_
749.html.
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having smartphones in their workplace,1 75 and Gen Zers find texting
the preferred method of workplace communication. 176 Today, those
under twenty-three years old do not know life without social media
or smartphones, have never purchased encyclopedias for research
purposes, and "shar[e] music, photos, news, and opinions as easily as
they breathe and eat." 177 In his book Gen Z @ Work, then seventeenyear-old author Jonah Stillman wrote, "I am a classic Gen Zer, I love
Snapchat and Twitter and think email is for my parent's
generation." 17 8 Even the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that Gen Zers
"increasingly turn to photos and videos to share information." 179 A
Maryland Court of Appeals, in discussing a victim who texted her
thirteen-year-old friend as a means of waking her up, perhaps
condescendingly noted that texting to wake another is, "[w]e
suppose ... how young Gen-Z individuals think these days."180
The 2010 U.S. Census reported that Gen Z made up about 24% of
the U.S. population.181 Today that number has dwindled to around

175. Ryan Jenkins, Statistics Exposing What Generation Z Wants from the
Workplace, RYAN JENKINS BLOG, https://blog.ryan-jenkins.com/statistics-exposingwhat-generation-z-wants-from-the-workplace (last visited Oct. 30, 2020).
176. See Larry Alton, Phone Calls, Texts or Email? Here's How Millennials
Prefer to Communicate, FORBES (May 11, 2017, 8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/larryalton/2017/05/ 11/how-do-millennials-prefer-tocommunicate/#78c0c3036d6f;
Kayla
Matthews,
How
Younger
Employees
Communicate in the Enterprise, INFORMATIONWEEK (Aug. 19, 2019, 8:00 AM),.
https://www.informationweek.com/strategic-cio/team-building-and-staffing/howyounger-employees-communicate-in-the-enterprise/a/d-id/1335543.
177. CANDACE STEELE FLIPPIN, GENERATION Z IN THE WORKPLACE 6 (2017).
178. DAVID STILLMAN & JONAH STILLMAN, GEN Z @ WORK: HOW THE NEXT
GENERATION IS TRANSFORMING THE WORKPLACE 13 (2018). In 2019, the Pew
Research Center reported that 22% of U.S. adults use Twitter and 69% use
Facebook. In the 18-24 range, 73% use Snapchat, 75% use Instagram, 44% use
Twitter, and 76% use Facebook. In the 25-29 range, 47% use Snapchat, 57% use
Instagram, and 84% Facebook. Andrew Perrin & Monica Anderson, Share of U.S.
Adults Using Social Media, Including Facebook, Is Mostly Unchanged Since 2018,
PEW RSCH. CTR. (April 10, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/04/10/
share-of-u-s-adults-using-social-media-including-facebook-is-mostly-unchangedsince-2018/.
179. EMW Women's Surgical Ctr., P.S.C. v. Beshar, 920 F.3d 421, 432 (6th Cir.
2019) (noting that increasing use of photos and videos to share information
underscores the relevance of sonogram images to giving informed consent to an
abortion).
180. Spencer v. State, No. 131359C, 2019 WL 1077183, at *1 n.3 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. Mar. 7, 2019); see also James F. Holderman & S. Ann Walls, As GenerationsX,
Y, and Z Determine the Jury's Verdict, What Is the Judge's Role?, 58 DEPAUL L. REV.
343, 347-49 (2009) (discussing the way that new generations of jurors think
differently than preceding generations due to their immersion in technology).
181. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AGE AND SEX COMPOSITION: 2010, at 2 (2011).
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20%.182 Starting in 2015, members of this large cohort began
qualifying for jury duty. 183 Gen Zers, like all generational groups,
have opinions on jury duty. According to a recent Pew Research poll,
only 50% of those age eighteen to twenty-nine feel a civic obligation
185
Even
to jury duty. 184 This compares with 70% of older Americans.
those Americans who believe in the jury system share a reluctance
186
Some states report a 50% noto participate when called upon.
duty. 187 And those who do
jury
to
called
show rate among those
report to jury duty often cite financial hardship, medical issues, or
188
family care obligations as support for being excused.
Jurors raised in the computer age have a different way of
thinking than do jurors born during the first ninety-five years of the
twentieth century. 189 Constant technological immersion has

182. Resident Population in the United States in 2017, by Generation, STATISTA,
79 7 3 2
1/us-population-by-generation/ (last visited
https://www.statista.com/statistis/
Nov. 1, 2020).
183. Generation Z began in 1997 and became eligible for jury duty eighteen
years later in 2015. See supra note 165.
184. John Gramlich, Jury Duty Is Rare, but Most Americans See It as Part of
Good Citizenship, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/
fact-tank/2017/08/24/jury-duty-is-rare-but-most-americans-see-it-as-part-of-goodcitizenship/. A majority of Americans still see jury duty as part of being a good
citizen. "Two-thirds of U.S. adults (67%) said serving on a jury 'is part of what it
means to be a good citizen."' Id.
185. Id.
186. Janet Stidman Eveleth, Jury Service in the 21st Century, MD. BAR J., MayJune 2009, at 48, 49.
187. Maxine Bernstein, Judges Cracking Down on People Who Snub Jury Duty,
https://apnews.com/article/
2017),
21,
(May
NEWS
AP
62b279c38615469fb9bee505c9c66ff5. Some states are being creative to encourage
jurors to show up. In Franklin County Municipal Court in Ohio, "the jury
commissioner has taken the unusual step of brewing fresh coffee for jurors and
playing music from a James Taylor concert on a flat-screen TV in the jury assembly
room as a way to help them relax. In Oregon's federal courts, jurors get $40 a day for
their service; it rises to $50 a day after [ten] days of duty. They get 53.5 cents a mile
for travel." Id.
188. Janet Stidman Eveleth, Will Jury Reforms Attract More Jurors?, MD. BAR
J., May-June 2000, at 42, 44.
189. Holderman & Walls, supra note 180, at 348 ("A typical Generation X-er,
before he or she reached the age of eighteen, spent 22,000 hours watching television.
That is more than twice the time Generation X-ers spent in a classroom.
Additionally, Generation X-ers have come of age with the widespread use of
computers and the internet in our culture. Following in their footsteps is Generation
Y. Members of Generation Y, also known as the Millennials, were born between
approximately 1980 and 2000 and were raised with computers dominating their
world. They 'are as comfortable with the [i]nternet as most [older] people are with
for practically everything-for
[i]nternet
the telephone' and 'use[] the
communication, news, research and entertainment.'" (alterations in original) (first
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impacted the ability to remain focused for long periods of time-the
average attention span of a Gen Zer is eight seconds.1 90 A judge
studying the issue suggested young jurors feel a "right not to be
bored." 19 1 This new normal of concentration levels yields limited
patience to the slow unfolding of the trial process without
opportunity for minimal distraction.
Gen Zers' documented shorter attention spans coupled with
today's communication habits make it unrealistic and perhaps even
a bit unfair to compel Gen Zers to meet jury expectations that predate the age of social media. In the next Part, I explore the
recommendations others have offered to accommodate the next
generation of jurors.1 92 Each is designed to assure jurors remain
technology-free while in jury boxes and deliberation rooms. None .of
these suggestions, however, acknowledge the present-day reality of
technology as an extension of communication. As this next Part will
show, the recommendations offered by others are ineffective to meet
the concerns of juror misconduct, but, fortunately, the long-standing
practice of judicial review for harmful error holds up as the best
means of assuring defendants get a trial free from juror misconduct
in this digital age.
IV. THE REALITY OF SUGGESTED JUROR REFORMS

Judges, bar organizations, and scholars have proposed
prohibitions,
admonitions,
and
increased
punishment
to
accommodate Gen Z and indeed most jurors. These measures fall
into three distinct groups: (1) banning smart phones; 193 (2)

quoting R. Rex Parris & James Wren, Reaching Jurors Across the Generations,
TRIAL, Mar. 2008, at 19, 22; and then quoting Richard S. Enyon, Four Generationsof
Lawyers: Bridging the Gaps, RES GESTAE, Apr. 2007, at 5, 5)).
190. The 11 Generation Z Statistics Advertisers Must Know, MEDIAIX,
https://mediakix.comlblog/the-generation-z-statistics-you-should-know/ (last updated
Nov. 12, 2018).
191. See Holderman & Walls, supra note 180, at 349 (quoting Tracy L.
McGaugh, GenerationX in Law School: The Dying of the Light or the Dawn of a New
Day?, 9 LEGAL WRITING 119, 124 (2003)).
192. See, e.g., id. at 343 (suggesting courts offer jurors a more interactive
experience); Jury Service Reform, ATRA, http://www.atra.org/issue/jury-servicereform/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2020) (suggesting courts adopt a one-day trial system).
193. See infra Part IV.A; see also Anita Ramasastry, Why Courts Need to Ban
Jurors' Electronic Communications Devices, FINDLAW,
(Aug.
11, 2009),
https://supreme.findlaw.com/legal-commentary/why-courts-need-to-ban-jurorselectronic-communications-devices.html.
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95
strengthening instructions; 194 and (3) increasing sanctions.1
Whatever their merits, none of these suggestions will curtail the
bigger issue of prohibiting ex parte communications and research by
jurors through cell phone use. Going forward, a jury system must
196
who do not
contemplate jurors who prefer to text rather than talk;
fabric of
the
share the kind of commitment to civic duty woven into
97
and who seek quick answers at a click,
previous generations;1
198
Additionally, any
rather than measured research and reflection.
potential solutions must serve the due process demands of the U.S.
Constitution.1 99
Prohibiting access to smart phones during trials, strengthening
jury instructions, and increasing sanctions are all reasonable
responses. Each, however, will ultimately prove ineffective at
prohibiting juror misconduct in the form of cell phone use.
Like so many other issues concerning technology and social
media, the constitutional safeguards put in place by the U.S.
Constitution work best to guarantee individual rights. In instances
where jurors engage in posting, texting, and tweeting, judges must
consider their conduct in the context of the harmful error standard.
Judges should evaluate the circumstances and then invalidate jury
verdicts only in instances where the juror's communications are so
problematic that they infringed on the defendant's constitutional
right to a fair trial.
Courts must recognize that not all cell phone use threatens
liberty. In instances where jurors' communications reflect emotions
or thoughts not likely to influence others, or where the juror can
demonstrate that their communications did not influence their own
decision-making process, courts must be content not finding a
violation. In these instances, the Constitution does not demand
judges set aside the verdict.
In the 2011 Arkansas Supreme Court case Dimas-Martinez v.
State,200 the court ruled that any cell phone communication on the
part of a juror had the potential to amount to a violation of the
defendant's due process rights. 20 1 This standard places too high a
burden on individuals and an unreasonable strain on the judicial

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.C.
See Pentchoukov, supra note 174.
See Gramlich, supra note 184.
See The 11 GenerationZ StatisticsAdvertisers Must Know), supra note 190.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
385 S.W.3d 238 (Ark. 2011).
Id. at 249.
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process. Where jury instructions prohibit any cell phone
communication during the trial, outside research, pressure from
outside sources, and other communications similar to traditional
forms of juror misconduct are still violations.2 0 2 Courts, however,
must accept that the next generation of jurors is wired differently,
and the system must bend to accommodate them.
Judicial process of evaluating juror misconduct need not be as
difficult as it may first appear. The proposals discussed below are
not worthwhile to achieve their intended goals. However, the
systems that have been in place for as long as the U.S. Constitution
still serve to preserve a defendant's due process rights. Judges must
continue to evaluate for harmful error, but, in so doing, the error
must be one that goes beyond violating a judge's instruction to
refrain from any cell phone use to the level of error that affects the
outcome of the trial so severely that it amounts to a violation of the
defendant's rights.
A. ProhibitionsBanningSmart Phones Completely
A condition of President Trump's impeachment was that
Senators sitting as jurors were prohibited from bringing their smart
phones into chambers. 203 Countless news articles commented on the
anxiety the cell phone ban caused. 204 Many federal courts similarly
prohibit access to smart phones while on jury duty. 205 Because focus
in the courtroom is paramount, bans on cell phone are implemented

202. See id.
203. Alexander Bolton, Senate Begins Preparationsfor Trump Trial, HILL (Jan.
15, 2020, 5:45 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/477673-senate-beginspreparations-for-trump-trial; Meg Wagner et al., The Senate Impeachment Trial Has
Officially Started, CNN POLITICS (Jan. 19, 2020, 9:27 PM), https://www.cnn.com/
politics/live-news/trump-impeachment-live-01-162020/h_84598252e14172cce93e5cb2c0446933 ("No use of phones or electronic devices
will be allowed in the Chamber.").
204. See, e.g., Peggy Drexler, Psychologist: Senators May Suffer from

Impeachment

Cell Phone Withdrawal, CNN

(Jan.

22,

2020,

10:51

PM),

https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/22/opinions/senators-impeachment-digital-detoxdrexler/index.html. See generally Lindsay Wise & Natalie Andrews, For Senators at
Impeachment Trial, No Coffee, No Cellphones and No Talking, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 22,
2020, 4:07 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/for-senators-at-impeachment-trial-nocoffee-no-cellphones-and-no-talking- 11579644399.
205. See, e.g., Additional FederalJury Duty Information, U.S. DIST. CT.: DIST. OF
MAss.,
http://www.mad.uscourts.gov/jurors/federal-information-more.htm
(last
visited Oct. 30, 2020); Mobile Phone and Court Attire, U.S. DIST. CT.: E. DIST. OF
CAL.,
http://www.caed.uscourts.gov/caednew/index.cfm/jury-info/mobile-phone-andcourt-attire/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2020).
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to remove distraction and assure complete attention to the matter at
hand. However, asking jurors to abandon their phones may cause a
2
different kind of distraction. 06
The unavailability of smart phones can create the type of digital
anxiety about which Patrick Brayer writes in his article The
Disconnected Juror: Smart Devices and Juries in the Digital Age of
Litigation.207 According to Brayer, national disasters like Hurricane
208
"As
Katrina created an emotional dependency on smart phones.
desperately
friends
survivors, evacuees, and concerned family and
attempted to connect, they found that their only mode of
communication was digital. They also realized that their new lifeline
of safety and comfort was no longer dependent upon the traditional
2
act of speaking and listening." 09
210
This digital connection attaches to a need to feel safe.
Removing that safety can make for a distracted juror, and a
distracted juror is not capable of focusing completely on the legal
2 11
matter at issue.

In an effort to regain control of their smart phones, some in the
212
courtroom have pushed back against federal and state bans.
Courts are justified in banning phones when they can demonstrate
that their reason for so doing was rationally related to their goal of
2 13
Outside of the
preventing infringement on due process rights.
courtroom, courts have upheld cell phone bans put in place in the
2 14
Many states prohibit
interest of both safety and decorum.

206.
207.
208.

Brayer, supra note 25, at 27.
Id.
Id. at 33-34.

209.
210.

Id.
Id. at 34-35.

211. Id. at 34. For a full understanding of the psychological attachment to cell
phones, see generally id.
212. See, e.g., Price v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 855 N.Y.S.2d 530, 542 (N.Y. App. Div.
2008).
213. See id.
214. See, e.g., Koch v. Adams, 361 S.W.3d 817, 819, 822 (Ark. 2010); Price, 855
N.Y.S.2d at 542. See generally Nicole Thieneman Maddox, Silencing Students' Cell
Phones Beyond the Schoolhouse Gate- Do Public Schools' Cell Phone Confiscationand
Retention Policies Violate Parents'Due Process Rights?, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 261 (2012)
(arguing that schools' prolonged confiscation of students' cell phones infringes on the
students' parents' constitutional right to direct the upbringing of their child).
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handheld phones while driving. 2 15 Airlines prohibit cellphone use to
make voice communication or access cellular data. 2 16
Courts that have imposed cell phone bans in the courtroom have
experienced little pushback. The Sixth Circuit bans phones and all
recording devices inside the courtroom unless authorized by the
judge. 217 States including Arizona, Georgia, Kansas, and Hawaii
have adopted a ban on all phones. 218 Although these bans extend to
anyone in the courtroom, the prohibition serves to meet the goals of
prohibiting juror cell phone use during trials.2 19
Bans on cell phone use in the courtroom have withstood
constitutional challenges from those opposing the policies. 220 In
2014, plaintiff Robert McKay sued Saginaw County officials,
challenging the constitutionality of a Saginaw County Michigan
order that banned, among other things, smart phones. 22 1 McKay
argued that the prohibition violated his First Amendment right to
record courtroom proceedings publicly. 222 The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan summarily rejected the
defendant's claim, reasoning that the Electronics Ban Order did not
prevent anyone from disseminating to the public any information

215. Cellular Phone Use and Texting While Driving Laws, NAT'L CONF. STATE
LEGISLATURES (May 29, 2019), https://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/cellularphone-use-and-texting-while-driving-laws.aspx.
216. 14 C.F.R. § 91.21 (2019). The FAA does not ban cell phone use but instructs
the Secretary of Transportation to issue regulations prohibiting voice
communications during flights. Matt Villano, Are Cell Phone Calls on Airplane
Flights Inevitable, CNN TRAVEL, https://www.cnn.com/travel/article/cell-phone-callsairplanes/index.html (last updated Dec. 20, 2019).
217. U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIR., ADMISSION TO THE POTTER
STEWART COURTHOUSE (n.d.).
218. Arizona, Georgia, Kansas, and Hawaii are some of the states that have allcourt cell phone bans. See ARIz. SUP. CT. R. 122.1; GA. UNIF. MUN. CT. R. 11; HAW.
SUP. CT. R. 5.3; KAN. MEDIA R. 1002. For a full list of bans by state, see Cell Phone
and Electronic Device Policies, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., https://www.ncsc.org/
topics/media/social-media-and-the-courts/state-links5 (last visited Oct 30, 2020).
219. See, e.g., ARIZ. SUP. CT. R. 122.1(a) ("This rule specifies the permitted and
prohibited uses of portable electronic devices in a courthouse.... A violation of this
rule may be punishable as contempt.").
220. See McKay v. Federspiel, 22 F. Supp. 3d 731, 736 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (holding
that there was no First Amendment right to record courtroom proceedings). But see
Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 573-74, 582-83 (1981) (holding the Constitution
does not bar entry of electronic media into judicial proceedings).
221. McKay, 22 F. Supp. 3d at 733. The "Electronics Ban Order" read, in
pertinent part, that "[e]xcept with a judge's permission, possession[,] and/or use of
the following devices is prohibited in court-related facilities: audio and/or video
recording and/or broadcasting devise[,] camera/photographic devices[,] [and]
electronic communication devices." Id.
222. Id. at 734.
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223
"The Saginaw
learned from attending courtroom proceedings.
County Court ha[d] not denied [the] right to attend and observe
courtroom proceedings; it ha[d] only prohibited the use of electronic
224
[recording] equipment inside the courtroom."
The McKay court, applying a four-part test to analyze the
constitutionality of the restrictions, gave sound reasoning for its
conclusion. 225 Having applied this standard, the court found that the
goals of limiting disruptions in judicial proceedings and preventing
jurors from conducting research online are interests important to the
judicial process. 2 26 The Electronic Ban Order, according to the court,
created order in the courtroom, an ideal paramount to the plaintiffs
22 7
right to 24/7 cell phone access.
While banning cell phone use inside the courtroom is
constitutional and undoubtedly permissible, that does not mean it
will be effective in preventing the type of out-of-court social media
communications that threaten defendants' due process rights.
Moreover, some argue that the cell phone ban, as it relates to jurors,
22 8
might actually impede the effective administration of justice.
Patrick Brayer argues that separating jurors from their smart
phones will cause the kind of real-life discomfort and disconnection
that may detract from jurors' ability to listen to all the evidence and
229
decide a case soundly.
There are benefits to banning smart phones in the courtroom. It
promotes courtroom decorum, protects against prohibited recordings,
and limits distractions. Such bans, however, do not prevent jurors
from tweeting, posting, or even researching when the court is not in

223. Id. at 735.
224. McKay v. Federspiel, No. 14-CV-10252, 2014 WL 7013574, at *3 (E.D. Mich.
Dec. 11, 2014), aff'd, 823 F.3d 862 (6th Cir. 2016). The court later noted in the order:
'"Although access cases are rooted in First Amendment principles, they have
developed along distinctly different lines than have freedom of expression cases."' Id.
at *4 (quoting S.H.A.R.K. v. Metro Parks Serving Summit Cnty., 499 F.3d 553, 559
(6th Cir. 2007)).
225. The court evaluated the ban under a four-pronged test. "First, a court must
'ask what rule the government is invoking that prohibits the plaintiffs from access to
information . . . .' Second, the court must determine 'whether that rule "selectively
delimits the audience."' Third, a court must 'inquire into the government's stated
interest for invoking the rule.' [Fourth], a court must 'apply the applicable test to
determine whether the government's stated interest is sufficiently related to the
means of accomplishing that interest . .. .." Id. at *5 (citations omitted) (quoting
S.H.A.R.K, 499 F.3d at 560-61).
226. Id. at *6.
227. Id. at *7.
228. See, e.g., Brayer, supra note 25, at 27.
229. Id. at 25-27, 47-48.
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session. These bans, .therefore, while constitutional, will never by
themselves succeed in preventing juror misconduct.
B. Admonitions: StrengtheningJury Instructions
Another way to combat juror misconduct is to strengthen juror
instructions. In 2009, the Judicial Conference Committee on Court
Administration and Case Management, a group over which the Chief
Justice of the United States presides, proposed model jury
instructions that added a caution against social media use. 230 They
suggested that judges give the following instruction before trial:
Until you retire to deliberate, you may not discuss
this case with anyone, even your fellow jurors. After
you retire to deliberate, you may begin discussing the
case with your fellow jurors, but you cannot discuss
the case with anyone else until you have returned a
verdict and the case is at an end. I know that many
of you use cell phones, Blackberries, the internet[,]
and other tools of technology. You also must not talk
to anyone at any time about this case or use these
tools to communicate electronically with anyone
about the case. This includes your family and friends.
You may not communicate with anyone about the
case on your cell phone, through e-mail, Blackberry,
iPhone, text messaging, or on Twitter, through any
blog or website, including Facebook, Google+, My
Space, LinkedIn, or YouTube. You may not use any
similar technology of social media, even if I have not
specifically mentioned it here. 231
And the following instruction at the close of the case:
During
your
deliberations,
you
must
not
communicate with or provide any information to
anyone by any means about this case. You may not
use any electronic device or media, such as the
telephone, a cell phone, smart phone, iPhone,

230. See generally JUD. CONF. COMM. ON CT. ADMIN. & CASE MGMT., PROPOSED
MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: THE USE OF ELECTRONIC TECHNOLOGY TO CONDUCT
RESEARCH ON OR COMMUNICATE ABOUT A CASE 1-2 (2012).
231. Id. at 1.
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Blackberry or computer, the [i]nternet, any [i]nternet
service, any text or instant messaging service, any
[i]nternet chat room, blog, or website such as
Facebook, MySpace, LinkedIn, YouTube or Twitter,
to communicate to anyone any information about this
case or to conduct any research about this case until I
accept your verdict. 232
Today such instructions are standard in both state and federal
courts. 2 33 The "new" instructions merely extend the long-standing
prohibition against speaking about the case to others or researching
234
from the time of
the case on one's own to include "technospeech"
235
from face-to-face
refraining
to
In addition
empanelment to verdict.
from
prohibited
communication or book research, jurors are
engaging in the same conduct via an internet connection.
In reality, present-day instructions merely add another layer of
prohibition to already prohibited conduct. Jurors are cautioned
against using smart phones, social media, and even Googling in
addition to face-to-face communicating about the case or engaging in
pre-internet research. Courts must anticipate that some jurors will
disregard these new instructions in much the same way that many
jurors have disregarded instructions banning independent research
236
Therefore, adding
via newspapers, radios, or even neighbors.
express language about social media use will continue to prohibit
those whose behavior was already bound by the rules but provides
no further impediment to those who might have violated previous
court instructions.
Respect for the current instruction to refrain from social media
use relating to the case on which a juror or prospective juror may sit
is not quite as binary as it was pre-social media or even pre-internet.
Today, information is much more accessible. No longer must a juror
sneak into a library or go through the effort of finding and reading a
newspaper. Instead, during an escape to a bathroom stall, jurors can
pull out their smart phones and access more information than is
contained in any library. In addition to greater access, the

232. Id. at 2.
233. See United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 304-05 (3d Cir. 2011) ("We
enthusiastically endorse these instructions and strongly encourage district courts to
routinely incorporate them or similar language into their own instructions.").
234. See Leslie Yalof Garfield, The Death of Slander, 35 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 17,
17 (2011) (defining "technospeech" as digital communication).
235. JUD. CONF. COMM. ON CT. ADMIN. & CASE MGMT., supra note 229, at 1-2.
236. See, e.g., Dimas-Martinez v. State, 385 S.W.3d 238, 242 (Ark. 2011).
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temptation is much higher than pre-internet days. A 2018 study
conducted by Deloitte Consulting firm found that, on average,
consumers check their phones over fifty-two times each day. 237 A
2020 study found that the average smartphone owner unlocks his or
her phone 150 times a day. 238 Sixty percent of U.S. consumers age
eighteen to thirty-four admitted they overuse their smart phones. 239
Frequent phone use corresponds with connecting with others. In
many instances, jurors are using their phone not to conduct research
or solicit input about the trial on which they sit but rather to share
their emotions and experiences. For example, the juror in Neulander
texted a "see no evil, speak no evil, hear no evil" emoji. 240 A juror on
a murder and child abuse case for shaken baby syndrome tweeted:
"Woke up early and knocked out at the gym before jury duty. Bout to
spark one, throw in a load of laundry, and tidy up the kitchen." 24I
The judge rejected the trial court's motion for a new trial finding
that, while the juror had violated the judge's rules, he had not
tweeted about the case. 242 One jury in a federal California case
posted the following on Facebook:
"Jury duty week three and we still don't have all the
panel selected";. "After all the stupid excuses and
people saying they hate police and black people to get
off jury duty hmmmm. ... Maybe' [I] should have
c[o]me up with a lame excuse also"; "my case was
suppose[d] to last six weeks and we[']re on week
three now and no end in sight[;] this sucks"; "[]ooks
like a two week stay for me @ jury duty ... "; "Fourth
week of jury duty and six weeks to go LUCKY

237. Todd Spangler, Are Americans Addicted to Smartphones?, VARIETY (Nov.
14, 2018, 12:36 PM), https://variety.com/2018/digital/news/smartphone-addictionstudy-check-phones-52-times-daily-1203028454/.
238. Deyan Georgiev, 51+ Scary Smartphone Addiction Statistics for 2020
[Nomophobia on the Rise], TECHJURY,
https://techjury.net/blog/smartphoneaddiction-statistics/#gref (last updated July 2, 2020).
239. Spangler, supra note 236.
240. Nolan, supra note 4, at 26.
241. Jess Sullivan, Judge: Juror's Twitter Messages During Trial Not
Prejudicial,DAILY REPUBLIC (Apr. 3, 2015, 8:31 PM), https://www.dailyrepublic.com/
all-dr-news/solano-news/crime-solano-county-courts/judge-jurors-twitter-messagesduring-trial-not-prejudicial/. Other tweets included "Are u kidding me? This jury
duty s-t s NOT for me dude," followed by "Oh they don't have snacks? Not even a
small pack of peanuts or mini bottles of water? Pure fu-ery." Id.
242. Id. In another instance, a juror friended a party to the case. The juror was
dismissed the following day. Tarrant County Juror Sentenced to Community Service
for Trying to 'Friend"Defendant on Facebook, supra note 148.
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ME ... "; "getting ready for jury duty"; "Week 5
of jury duty"; "Jury duty week six ... "; and "Back
to jury duty can it get any more BORING than going
243
over metro pcs phone records ... uuuggghhhhhh.
In response to a motion to dismiss the case based on harmful
error, a California appellate court found the above words nonprejudicia. 244
Courts are beginning to acknowledge that a juror's smart phone
use during trial does not necessarily correlate to a propensity to
245
In
investigate trial matters to the extent of creating prejudice.
many instances, these commutations are innocuous, at least in
246
As one
relation to a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights.
every
broadcasting
to
used
are
we
California judge noted, "When
that
stop
to
waking moment of our lives, how are you supposed
247
The answer is that "we" are
behavior when you're on a jury?"
not, nor should we. Prohibiting cell phone use as it relates to
investigatory matters not presented in the courtroom should be
prohibited. But mere use of a cell phone to share feelings are akin
to sharing those same feelings through voice communications and
should not be prohibited. 248 Where such communications were not
prohibited prior to the internet, the fact that the same type of
communications are now more widely disseminated should not
serve as grounds to prohibit them. 24 9
C. Punishment:IncreasingSanctions for JurorMisconduct
Juror misconduct has serious consequences. Where it rises to the
level of harmful error, misconduct can result in a mistrial. Declaring
a mistrial is both timely and costly. It taxes the court system, which
must hold another trial for a charge already litigated. Additionally,

243. People v. Cornelius, No. C073004, 2016 WL 5112052, at *12 (Cal. Ct. App.
Sept. 21, 2016).
244. Id. at *12.
245. See, e.g., id.
246. See, e.g., id.
247. Sarah Moses Buckshot, Neulander Case Shows Perils of Texting During
Jury Duty, SYRACUSE.COM, https://www.syracuse.com/crime/2015/07/expert-jurors_
(last updated Mar. 22,
must_disconnect_fromsmartphones_during_trials.html

2019).
248. See Amanda McGee, Juror Misconduct in the Twenty-First Century: The
Prevalence of the Internet and Its Effect on American Courtrooms, 30 LOY. LA. ENT.

L. REv. 301, 312 (2010).
249.

See id.
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it places an added emotional toll on the defendant and other parties
to the case. There are significant financial consequences, too: the
defendant must pay for additional lawyer's fees, and the state or
federal government must bear the cost of a new trial. A mistrial
causes hardship to everyone involved in the case except the juror
whose misconduct caused it.250 In far too many instances, the court
imposes on the juror little more than a slap on the wrist.
There are sanctions in place for jurors who disregard jury
instructions. They range from contempt, which can lead to jail time
or fines to warnings or dismissal from the jury (which quite often is
not a sanction at all!). In a 2012 study, thirty federal judges
discussed the actions they took when jurors used social media: nine
judges removed the juror from the jury; eight cautioned the juror but
allowed him or her to remain. 251 Only four judges declared a
mistrial.252 One held the juror in contempt, and one other fined the
juror. 253
The lack of enforcement against jurors who engage in misconduct
is low when measured against the greater harm their misconduct
can cause. In 2009, California attempted to pass legislation that
criminalized juror misconduct in the form of social media use. 2 54 The
former § 166(a)(6) of the California Penal Code provided that a juror
who is willfully disobedient of a court admonishment related to
prohibitions on "electronic or wireless communication or research"
was in contempt of court and, therefore, "guilty of a
misdemeanor." 255 The California Penal Code defines "willfully" as "a
purpose or willingness to commit the [proscribed] act .... It does not
require any intent to violate law, or to injure another, or to acquire

any advantage." 256 Therefore, a court could find any juror who
purposefully disobeyed a judge's admonishment against using
wireless or electronic devices in the prohibited ways in contempt
and, thus, guilty of a misdemeanor. 257

250.

See id. at 306.

251. Steve Eder, Jurors'Tweets Upend Trial, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB10001424052970204571404577255532262181656 (last updated Mar. 5,
2012, 8:10 PM). (noting seven other judges gave an unspecified type of sanction).
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Assemb. B. No. 2217, 2009-2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009). The bill
passed both Houses of the Legislature before being vetoed by the Governor. See id.
255. CAL. PENAL CODE § 166(a)(6) (West 2012), amended by Assemb. B. No.
2683, 2013-2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014).
256. CAL. PENAL CODE § 7(1) (West 2017).
257. Consistent with this view, the California Legislature enacted Statutes 2011,
chapter 181, clarifying that jurors may not use social media and the internet-such
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Even without statutory mandates courts have held jurors in
contempt. In Oregon, a judge held a juror in contempt after noticing
2 8
The juror spent the day in
his cell phone glow as it received a text.
2 59
A Florida judge sentenced a juror to
jail instead of in a cburtroom.
260
A
three days in jail after he friended a defendant in a jury trial.
North Carolina judge held a juror in contempt and declared a
26
mistrial following discovery that the juror took notes on his phone. i
Case law offers many other instances in which sanctions were the
remedy of choice. 26 2 There is as of yet no data to show how often

as texting, Twitter, Facebook, and internet searches-to research or disseminate
information about cases and can be held in criminal or civil contempt for violating
these restrictions. The bill analysis highlighted that "[t]he use of [electronic and
wireless] devices by jurors presents an ongoing challenge in preventing mistrials,
overturned convictions and chaotic delays in court proceedings. In response, this
common sense measure seeks to clarify and codify an informal practice among trial
courts to authorize courts to appropriately admonish jurors against the use of
electronic and wireless devices to communicate, research, or disseminate information
about an ongoing case." LINDA A. WENDLING, ETHICS FOR PARALEGALS 374 (2d ed.
2018) (alterations in original) (citation omitted); see Kimberly Chow, Chapter 181:
The End to Juror Electronic Communications, 43 MCGEORGE L. REv. 581, 584-

86 (2012).
258. JurorHeld in Contempt for Texting During Trial, NPR (Apr. 19, 2013, 12:15
7 79 4 6 4
15/juror-in-oregon-held-in-contempthttps://www.npr.org/2013/04/19/1
PM),
for-texting-during-trial.
259. Id.
260. See Eder, supra note 250.
261. Jeff Welty, Holding Jurors in Contempt for Cell Phone Use, N.C. CRIM. L.
(Jun. 15, 2015, 11:07 AM), https://nccriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/holding-jurors-incontempt-for-cell-phone-use/.
262. See, e.g., Richey v. McLeod, 188 So. 228, 229 (Fla. 1939) (fining a juror
twenty-five dollars); Hawkins v. Commonwealth, No. 2018-CA-001361-MR, slip op.
at 10 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 14, 2020) (removing a phone from a juror). In one case, a
trial judge held a spectator in contempt when her cell phone rang while the court
was in session. See McRoy v. State, 31 So. 3d 273, 274 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). The
Florida appellate court reversed the charge, noting that "[c]ontempt is an act tending
to embarrass, hinder, or obstruct the court in the administration of justice, or to
lessen the court's authority or dignity." Id. In one federal district court case, the
court punished the defendant rather than the juror who committed the misconduct.
United States v. Parse, 789 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 2015). In that case, attorneys for the
defendant discovered through internet research that one of the jurors had possibly
lied during voir dire. Id. at 86, 94. Rather than alert the court at the time he
discovered the juror's potential misinformation, the defendant's counsel raised their
suspicions after the court found the defendant guilty and the government introduced
a letter from the juror at issue, at which point the attorney asked for a mistrial. Id.
at 94. The court granted the mistrial against the defendant's co-defendants, none of
whom had participated in the concealment, but, knowing that a court would likely
reverse the decision, the trial judge did not grant the mistrial for the defendant. Id.
at 86. The district court concluded that Parse, by not speaking up sooner, had waived
his right to a new trial despite not personally knowing of the omission. Id. The court
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courts declare mistrials due to juror misconduct. One scholar
suggests that mistrials due to juror misconduct have decreased in
recent years, despite the many opportunities for juror misconduct
available during the digital age. 26 3
Contempt, however, is a harsh punishment, and it may be that
its greatest effect is to deter potential jurors from serving on a trial.
The sense of civic responsibility for jury duty diminishes with each
generation post-WWII, with Gen Z showing the least amount of
enthusiasm to the obligation. 264 The additional threat of sanctions,
contempt, fines, or otherwise is most likely to serve as further
impetus for potential jurors to evade their responsibility. 265 As Judge
Brian Walsh of Santa Clara, California thoughtfully observed, "You
want to present the jurors' obligations to serve as an inviting
opportunity to participate in the democratic process . . . . One could
consider it counterproductive to be laying out all the penalties a
juror can incur if they blow it."266
Where Gen Z jurors are concerned, there is the additional issue
of intent. Although intent is not an element of juror misconduct, the
juror's purpose in tweeting or posting their feelings or even location
while on jury duty often lacks the goal of undermining defendant's
Sixth Amendment rights. 267 Violating a judge's prohibition against
social media use or texting, however, is more akin to a strict liability
offense. Merely engaging in the prohibited conduct is wrong in the
eyes of the law. For instance, does a juror's post that reads "another

&

stated that it "bears noting at the outset that a defendant can waive certain rights
through the actions of his attorneys, even if the defendant himself was unaware of
the circumstances and actions giving rise to the waiver." Id. at 101 (quoting United
States v. Daugerdas, 867 F. Supp. 2d 445, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)). The Court of
Appeals reversed, granting Parse a new trial. Id. at 120.
263. Timothy J. Fallon, Note, Mistrial in 140 Characters or Less? How the
Internet and Social Networking Are Undermining the American Jury System and
What Can Be Done to Fix It, 38 HOFSTRA L. REV. 935, 936, 945 (2010).
264. See Gramlich, supra note 184.
265. Sudhin Thanawala, California Jurors Misusing the Internet Could Face
Fines, AP NEWS (Apr. 24, 2016), https://apnews.com/article/47a337400517448fbe
58b4aba4celd41. Judges are also not beyond reproach. A Suffolk County judge
texted prosecutors from the bench and faced sanctions. David M. Schwartz
Andrew Smith, Suffolk Judge Texted Prosecutorsfrom Bench, Could Face Sanctions,
NEWSDAY
(Dec.
8,
2017,
10:29
PM),
https://www.newsday.com/longisland/suffolk/suffolk-judge-recuses-texting-1.15355271.
266. Thanawala, supra note 264.
267. See, e.g., Brayer, supra note 25, at 26 (noting jurors use technology
primarily as a link to their community); Douglas L. Keene & Rita R. Handrich,
Online and Wired for Justice: Why Jurors Turn to the Internet (the "Google Mistrial"),
JURYEXPERT (Nov. 1, 2009), http://www.thejuryexpert.com/2009/11/online-and-wiredfor-justice-why-jurors-turn-to-the-internet-the-google-mistrial/.
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day of jury duty, glad it is raining out" mean the juror tweeted about
the case? Such tweets fall short of the archetypical forms of
misconduct like researching Paxil or driving past the scene of a
crime.268
Increased sanctions would be detrimental to our jury system in a
way that is different than the presence of smart phones. It would
deter future jurors and skew an already skewed system. As one
commentator wrote, "Somewhere between our founding fathers and
our palm pilots, jury duty became a bad ex-boyfriend--disrupting
and better if avoided." 26 9 Harsh punishments for jurors will only
serve to limit the jury pool even further.
V. TRADITIONAL REVIEW IN A MODERN WORLD

Technological threats to juror misconduct do not demand tighter
regulatory control. Bans on smart phone use, increased sanctions, or
more stringent jury instructions will not remedy the proliferation of
smart phone communication among Gen Z jurors. Proposed reforms
are more likely to chill juror participation. Going forward, courts
must forgive juror smart phone communication generally and only
limit such use to instances in which a text, tweet, or post prejudices
defendant's constitutional rights to due process of the law.
Florida's model jury instructions are similar to most. They
prohibit fellow jurors from "communication includ[ing] ... e-mailing,
text messaging, tweeting, blogging, or any other form of
communication" about the case. 270 Communications about feelings or
status are not "communications about the case." Labeling these
innocuous communications as harmful is overreaching and
unreasonable.
Gen Z, and indeed members of almost all generational cohorts,
communicate differently than in the pre-social media age. In the
past, one might have gone home and confided in a parent or partner
following a long day of jury duty; today, many citizens vent via more
public means. 271 Today, younger individuals are more likely to use

268. See Sherman v. Smith, 89 F.3d 1134, 1135-36 (4th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Morrow, 412 F. Supp. 2d 146, 164, 167 (D.D.C. 2006); People v. Wadle, 77
P.3d 764, 766, 769-70 (Colo. App. 2003).
269. K.B. Battaglini et al., Jury Patriotism: The Jury System Should Be
Improved for Texans Called to Serve, 35 ST. MARY'S L.J. 117, 120 n.11 (2003)
(citation omitted).
270. See Criminal Jury Instructions Chapter 2: Instructions During the Trial,
supra note 72 (Section 2.1 provides this instruction).
271. See Brayer, supra note 25, at 26.
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social media as their platform of communication. 272 Texts like "[a]s if
one day of jury duty wasn't enough smh day 2 I'm soooo over it
already!!!!" 273 are innocuous and do not justify granting a mistrial.
Gen Z jurors, unlike those of a generation ago, use social media to
put into print words that prior jurors spoke to their neighbors or
friends. 274 A February 2020 New York Times headline proclaimed,
"On College Campuses, Social Media Provides Private Spaces for
Thousands." 275 The article made clear that today social media posts
are akin to face-to-face conversations. 276 Professor Katie Davis found
Gen Z students have two parallel forms of communication, the faceto-face experience and an experience happening on social media. 277
Today, Gen Zer's subscribe to social media feeds "that offer them
'private' conversations-with thousands." 278
Defining communications about a juror's status, feelings, or
emotions regarding their obligation for jury duty as juror misconduct
will place an unnecessary burden on the court system. As the
number of Gen Z jurors increases, so, too, will defendants' demands
to dismiss jurors or grant new trials because of juror misconduct due
to smart phone communication. Judges must dismiss words that go
to the juror's own emotion or general state of mind as nonprejudicial. The trial judge in the Neulander case ruled that texts
from a parent reading, "[m]ake sure he is guilty"279 were not
sufficient to support a mistrial. The judge correctly observed that

272. Global Digital Communication: Texting, Social Networking Popular
Worldwide, PEW RSCH. CTR., https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2011/12/20/globaldigital-communication-texting-social-networking-popular-worldwide/
(last updated
Feb. 29, 2012). See generally Katie Davis et al., "Everything's the Phone:
Understanding the Phone's Supercharged Role in Parent-Teen Relationships, 227
CHI 1 (2019) (analyzing the relationship between modern phone use and parentteenager relationships).
273. People v. Daily, No. 1-16-0813, 2018 WL 6920110, at *2 (Ill. App. Ct. Dec.
31, 2018).
274. See Brayer, supra note 25, at 28.
275. Laura Pappano, On College Campuses, Social Media Provides Spaces for
Thousands, N.Y. TMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/20/education/learning/
social-media-college.html (last updated Feb. 21, 2020).
276. See id.
277. Id.; see also Davis et al., supra note 271, at. 3-4 (describing different ways
technology creates new avenues of communication and topics for families to discuss):
278. Pappano, supra note 274.
279. People v. Neulander, 80 N.Y.S.3d 791, 795-96 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018) aff'd,
135 N.E.3d 302 (N.Y. 2019).

216

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88.173

receiving the text did not compromise the juror's impartiality in the
2 80
case or their respect for the jury system.
As many courts have noted, "[t]here is no bright line test for
determining whether a defendant has suffered prejudice from an
instance of juror misconduct." 28 1 Judges must continue to weigh
juror misconduct against the likelihood that the defendant received
282
an impartial evaluation from the offending juror or jurors. Where
a defendant asserts harmful error because of juror misconduct via
smart phone communication, 28 3 the judge must continue to apply the
long-standing harmful error test, but the judge must do so with a
slight modification.
Where social media or texting is at issue, it is incumbent upon
judges to conduct a two-pronged review. Judges must first ask
whether the text violated the judge's instruction to refrain from
smart phone communication. Under this prong, the judge cannot
presume that all texting, tweeting, or posting while on jury duty is
harmful to defendant's due process rights. Rather, the judge must
pay particular attention to whether the challenged communications
were "about the case."284 In defining "about the case," judges are
cautioned to draw a narrow definition. Only those communications
that reflect a juror's inability to remain impartial justify a finding of
juror misconduct.
Once judges determine that the offended language could be
prejudicial, the judge must then consider whether that information
so compromised the juror or his or her fellow jurors as to prevent the
consideration. 285
jury
unbiased
receiving
from
defendant
This two-pronged inquiry will weed out those innocuous digital

280. See id. at 798 (Smith & Winslow, JJ., dissenting). In overturning the case,
the Supreme Court, Appellate Division ruled that conduct beyond mere
communication (e.g., lying and outside research) supported its finding. Id. at 797.
281. United States v. Montes, 628 F.3d 1183, 1188 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Sassounian v. Roe, 230 F.3d 1097, 1109 (9th Cir. 2000)); State v. Christensen, 929
N.W.2d 646, 671 (Iowa 2019) (quoting Sassounian, 230 F.3d at 1109).
282. See Montes, 628 F.3d at 1188.
283. In instances where a juror Googles a related legal or factual issue or
receives news or other information relating to the case from those outside the trial,
the Ninth Circuit's four-part test for harmful error due to juror misconduct serves as
an ideal mode for evaluating misconduct in the form of Google searches or other
electronic research. Id. Courts must weigh matters like the extent to which the
information was discussed and considered and the point at which the information
was introduced. Id.
284. See, e.g., Criminal Jury Instructions Chapter 2: Instructions During the
Trial, supra note 72 (Section 2.1 provides this instruction).
285. See Montes, 628 F.3d at 1188.
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communications that would have been permissible had they occurred
in face-to-face conversations.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Harmful Error Test, already in place, seems the most logical
response to juror misconduct via social media abuse. Banning cell
phones entirely is impractical and ineffective. 286 It is unlikely a court
will allow a permanent ban during the duration of a trial, and bans
while court is in session merely postpone individual smartphone use.
Strengthened jury instructions pose a similar problem. 287 Most
courts already caution against smartphone use. Despite warnings "in
the hundreds," according to the Judge in the Neulander case, a juror
still engaged in 7,000 communications while court was in session. 28 8
A third option, increasing sanctions, offers the most reasonable route
to curtailing juror misconduct, 289 but those sanctions would likely
have an impact beyond deterring juror misconduct; they would deter
individuals from jury duty altogether.
Some argue that the prevalence of smartphones and the ease
with which they are used lead to an increase in mistrials. 290 Much of
the communications shared through text, tweets, and posts,
however, are innocuous and are not of the kind that threaten a
defendant's due process rights. It remains the role of a judge to
discern between constitutionally threatening and non-threatening
digital communications, finding harmful error in those limited
instances where the communication goes directly to the jurors'
ability to remain impartial during deliberations.
Fortunately; even in the face of all these changes, pre-internet
laws survive and adapt alongside new technologies. Though the
threats that infringe defendants' rights take on new forms, the best
way to safeguard those rights remains for courts to apply the
harmful error test to instances of juror misconduct. 29 1 The presence
of new technology demands change; failure to accommodate Gen Z
communication will yield a breakdown in our jury system.
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See supra Part IVA.
See supra Part IV.B.
Nolan, supra note 4, at 24.
See supra Part IV.C.
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Estrada v. Scribner, 512 F.3d 1227, 1235 (9th Cir. 2008).

